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Abstract: The proper plaintiff rule reflects the elemental legal principle that only 
the right-holder is entitled to enforce the right.  At common law, as a corollary of 
this principle, only when the general meeting was incapable of acting in the 
corporate interest could a derivative action be brought. It followed from this 
principle that wrongdoer control of the shareholder meeting was a pre-requisite 
to derivative litigation. The Companies Act 2006 introduced what is considered 
to be a ‘new’ derivative action mechanism. Although the Act is silent about the 
wrongdoer control requirement, it is widely understood to have abolished it.  
Central to this understanding is the view that this is what Parliament intended, as 
supported by a view of the mischief of the Act and by several ministerial 
statements. However, careful attention to the extra-legislative record as well as to 
the rules on statutory interpretation render this view of the mischief of the Act 
inaccurate and these statements of ministerial intent inadmissible. Detaching our 
interpretation of the Act from reliance upon this record opens up unexpected 
possibilities when combined with observations from recent authority which 
suggest that the Act’s reforms were not intended to abolish the proper plaintiff 
principle. A compelling case can be made that wrongdoer control remains as a 
threshold condition to derivative litigation.  
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I INTRODUCTION 
 
Consensus practitioner or academic opinion is not an admissible interpretative aid 
in determining the purpose and meaning of legislation. Yet in practice such 
consensus views may infiltrate the interpretative process. This problem is 
particularly acute in the context of legislative reform projects where there is a 
consensus narrative as to both the prior legal problem and the intended legislative 
response. When ‘we all know’ what the legislative change was intended to remedy 
it is easy to ride rough shot over legislative ambiguities that do not fit with the 
narrative. In such contexts there is a risk that consensus views, although formally 
inadmissible, disperse literal legislative ambiguity and its exploration.  In doing so 
academic and practitioner consensus becomes a latent, and illegitimate, source of 
law.  One area raising such problems is the recent reform of derivative action law 
in the United Kingdom.  
Prior to the Companies Act 2006, English company law made it very difficult 
to bring derivative litigation. Through a common law rule known alternatively as 
the Rule in Foss v Harbottle or the proper plaintiff rule, English law affirmed the 
fundamental right of the company through its organs to make the litigation 
decision in relation to a breach of an obligation owed to it. It allowed this right to be 
circumvented only in very restrictive circumstances.  Derivative actions could only 
be brought in relation to breaches of duty which injured the company and 
benefited the directors personally (wrongs that were generally referred to as 
‘fraud’) and where the directors in breach of duty – the wrongdoers – had de jure or 
de facto control of the general meeting of the company through their shares.  This 
meant that derivative actions were simply unavailable in relation to negligence 
claims against any company or in relation to any claim at all against a director of a 
widely held company, where a wrongdoing director would never be in control of 
the general meeting.  
These rules were thought by many to be too complex, incoherent and too 
restrictive. The Law Commission was asked to consider the state of the law and to 
make recommendations. They did so judiciously, concluding that the law was too 
restrictive and in places unclear. They recommended the introduction of a judge 
controlled process which would allow derivative actions to be commenced in 
relation to any breach of duty, but provided the court with the power to determine 
whether such actions should be able to continue. It was proposed that this power 
would to be exercised in accordance with a set of factors - such as whether in a 
hypothetical director’s view the litigation would be in interests of the company - 
which in some instances would be determinative of the court’s decision and in 
others merely factors to be considered by the court in exercising their discretion. 
The Commission’s recommendation that reform was necessary was accepted by 
the Government and reforms were enacted in Part 11 of the Companies Act 2006.  
Part 11 is widely viewed by corporate academics and practitioners as a 
significant corporate legal moment involving the introduction of a ‘new’ derivative 
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claim mechanism.1 For many it represents the end of the era of the Rule of Foss v 
Harbottle. Professor Davies observes in this regard that the common law derivative 
action rules have been ‘consigned to the dustbin’.2 From now on the question 
whether a derivative action (referred to by the Act as a derivative claim) can be 
brought will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Act without 
any need to engage with the prior rules.   More specifically, the statute provides 
that there is no ‘fraud’ restriction on the types of breach of duty that could form 
the basis of a derivative action, and it is widely understood to have abolished the 
threshold requirement of having to show wrongdoer control. The former change 
was set forth explicitly in the Act which contains an expanded list of wrongs in 
relation to which members can bring a derivative claim.3  However, wrongdoer 
control is not addressed directly by the Act. Its abrogation is inferred.   
Many open issues and questions remain about how the courts will apply Part 
11, the most fundamental of which involve the relationship between Part 11 and 
the common law rules on derivative actions.  On one view, there is no such 
relationship because the common law rules have been consigned to the dustbin by 
Part 11 which represents a clean regulatory slate. Yet there remain elements of 
doubt about this ‘clean-slate’ approach. For example, Daniel Lightman has 
recently argued that Part 11 has no effect on the common law rules on multiple 
derivative actions because Part 11 only addresses direct derivative actions.4 More 
fundamental still is the question of the status and contemporary implications of 
the proper plaintiff rule. Recent first instance decisions raise the issue of whether 
this rule may not have been abolished by the Act.5  Attention to the Explanatory 
Notes to the Company Law Reform Bill and to Parliamentary debates supports this 
position. But treating the proper plaintiff rule as a still applicable substantive rule 
of law has the potential to transform our understanding of Part 11.  
The proper plaintiff rule set forth in Foss v Harbottle is the parent of the 
wrongdoer control pre-requisite to bringing derivative litigation at common law. It 
provides that only the company itself can bring litigation for the infringement of 
obligations owed to it and only if the company is disabled from acting (such as 
where there is wrongdoer control of the general meeting) will the law countenance 
a derivative action.  If it is not so disabled the proper plaintiff rule provides that a 
derivative action cannot be brought.  The wrongdoer control requirement is not, as 
it is sometimes presented, a procedural appendage to the proper plaintiff rule. It is 
the substantive product of this elemental rule.   If the proper plaintiff rule as a 
substantive rule of law survives the enactment of Part 11, then the requirement to 
                                                     
1 See D. Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (1st ed, 2009), 551, J; Lowry and A. Reisberg, 
Pettet's Company Law (3rd eds, 2009), 250. 
2 P. Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (8th Edition, 2008) (hereinafter 'Gower 
and Davies'), 615 (hereinafter ‘Gower and Davies’).   
3  Section 260(3) Companies Act 2006.  
4 D. Lightman, 'Two Aspects of the Statutory Derivative Claim' (2011) Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law 
Quarterly 142. 
5 Wishart v Castleford Securities Ltd [2009] CSIH 6 (Inner House); Cinematic Finance Ltd v Ryder & ors [2010] 
EWHC 3387; Bamford v Harvey [2012] EWHC 2858 (Ch). 
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show wrongdoer control must remain as part of contemporary derivative action 
law and we must make sense of how it is to be applied consistently with Part 11. 
Yet this view that wrongdoer control is relevant at all is deeply at odds with 
today's consensus view that Part 11’s objective was to abolish wrongdoer control 
as a threshold condition to bringing derivative litigation. A view that is also 
informed by, and rests heavily upon, the Parliamentary debates.   
This article foregrounds this tension between the old and the new derivative 
action rules and explores the strength of the case for the continued application of 
common law proper plaintiff rule together with its corollary, the wrongdoer 
control requirement. The article shows that the Act alone can be read either as a 
clean slate or as a new procedure through which the pre-existing substantive 
common law position is to be applied.  When coupled with canons of statutory 
interpretation on the relationship between legislation and the prior common law 
rules there is, based on an interpretation of the Act alone, a bias towards the continuing 
applicability of the proper plaintiff rule and of the wrongdoer control requirement 
as a threshold condition.   
The widely-held consensus that wrongdoer control as a threshold 
requirement to bringing derivative litigation has been abolished rests, therefore, 
upon the admissibility of a particular understanding of the mischief of the Act as 
well as upon the Rule in Pepper v Hart6 and the various ministerial statements that 
the intention of the Act was to remove the wrongdoer control requirement. 
However, when this record is filtered through the rules that determine which 
extra-legislative documents are admissible as either evidence of the mischief 
addressed by a statute or the intention of Parliament then we are left with an 
admissible extra-legislative record that does not support the view that the Act 
abolished either the proper plaintiff rule or the wrongdoer control requirement.  
Of course, when one’s view of a statute and Parliament’s intention is formed 
by facts that are inadmissible to the interpretative process it is extremely difficult 
to detach knowledge of these facts from the interpretative process. As Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson observed in Pepper v Hart:  ‘having once looked at what was 
said in Parliament it is difficult to put it out of mind’.7 This article argues that if we 
can manage to put it out of our mind we will see that, unexpectedly, the 
wrongdoer control requirement is still applicable.   
   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
6 [1993] AC 593.  
7 Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 [117] quoted also by Lord Steyn above n. 116 at 66 when discussing the 
practical difficulties of separating consideration of the ministerial statements after an exhaustive 
consideration of the meaning of the statute. 
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II PRE-2006 DERIVATIVE ACTIONS 
 
A. THE RULE IN FOSS V HARBOTTLE AND WRONGDOER CONTROL 
 
In Foss v Harbottle, the foundational derivative action case, Wigram VC held that 
the derivative litigant had no standing to bring the action. The decision was based 
on two propositions: first, that the company itself had been wronged and, 
therefore, only the company through its board and shareholder body could elect to 
sue;8 and second, that it made no sense for the court to entertain an action which 
could at any subsequent time be ratified and cured by the general meeting.9 Both 
propositions are rooted in the notion that it is for the company as a separate legal 
person to decide what to do in relation to wrongs to which it has been subject.  
Wigram VC also held that in the absence of an adequate remedy for a wrong ‘the 
claims of justice would be found superior to any difficulties arising out of technical 
rules’. He observed further that:   
 
In order for this [derivative action] to be sustained it must be shewn either that 
there is no such power as I have supposed remaining in the [governing body 
of proprietors to confirm the unlawful act] or, at least, that all means have 
been resorted to and found ineffectual to set that body in motion (emphasis 
supplied). 
 
This paragraph suggested two grounds which could justify a derivative action: first, 
where the shareholder meeting does not have the power to confirm or ratify a 
wrong as in such a situation the courts’ practical concern that its actions could be 
undermined at any time by shareholder confirmation are no longer relevant; and 
second, where the corporate organs cannot be set in motion in the company’s 
interests because of some practical barrier to action10 or because the organs are 
controlled by the parties who have allegedly wronged the company. In Attool v 
Merryweather, Page VC observed in this regard: 
 
If I were to hold that no bill could be filed by shareholders to get rid of the 
transaction on the ground of the doctrine of Foss v. Harbottle, it would be 
simply impossible to set aside a fraud committed by a director under such 
                                                     
8 Wigram VC observed that 'whilst the supreme governing body, the proprietors at a special meeting 
assembled, retain the power of exercising the functions conferred upon them by the Act of 
Incorporation, it cannot be competent to individual corporators to sue'. He observed further: 'how then 
can this court act in a suit constituted as this, if it is to be assumed for the purposes of this argument that 
the powers of the body of proprietors are still in existence and may lawfully be exercised'. 
9 Ibid: 'Whilst the court may be declaring the acts complained of to be void at the suit of the present 
plaintiffs, who in fact may be the only proprietors who disapprove of them, the governing body of 
proprietors may defeat the decree by lawfully resolving upon the confirmation of the very acts which are 
the subject of the suit'.  
10 In Foss v Harbottle one of the claims was that it was not possible to call a shareholder meeting due to the 
absence of formally appointed directors. 
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circumstances, as the director obtaining so many shares by fraud would 
always be able to outvote everybody else.11 
 
Accordingly, as James LJ observed in Gray v Lewis, the basic ‘rule laid down in Foss 
v Harbottle’ is that: ‘where there is a body corporate capable of filing a bill for itself 
to recover property either from its directors or officers, or from any other person. 
That corporate body is the proper plaintiff, and the only proper plaintiff’.12  It is 
most important to note  that although it is typically described as an exception to 
the rule,13 the legal relevance of wrongdoer control arises as the substantive 
product of the proper plaintiff rule. It is only where the company, through its 
organs, is ‘[in]capable’ of acting that derivative litigation can be considered at all.14   
It follows therefore, as was held in Smith v Croft (no.2),15 that even where there is 
wrongdoer control, such control does not permit a derivative action where an 
independent corporate organ – such as the disinterested shareholder body - makes 
a litigation decision on behalf of the company.   
 
Ultimately, the question which has to be answered in order to determine 
whether the rule in Foss v Harbottle applies to prevent a minority shareholder 
seeking relief as plaintiff for the benefit of the company is: ‘Is the plaintiff 
being improperly prevented from bringing these proceedings on behalf of the 
company?’ If it is an expression of the corporate will of the company by an 
appropriate independent organ that is preventing the plaintiff from 
prosecuting the action, he is not improperly but properly prevented and so 
the answer to the question is ‘No’.16 
 
Accordingly, in Barrett v Duckett17  the availability (and good sense) of placing the 
company in liquidation, which would place corporate power in the hands of an 
independent liquidator, meant that there was no longer wrongdoer control. For 
Lawrence Collins J (as he then was) In Konamaneni v Rolls-Royce Industrial Power 
(India) Ltd18 such an alternative remedy was ‘not an independent bar to a derivative 
                                                     
11 As the Court of Appeal in Prudential Assurance v Newman observed: ‘the reason [for the wrongdoer control 
rule] is that [if the derivative litigant were denied the right to sue] their grievance could never reach the 
court because the wrongdoers themselves, being in control, would not allow the company to sue’. [1982] 
1 ALL ER 354, 358. 
12 (1873) LR 8 Ch. App. 1035 (emphasis added). See, also, Russell v Wakefield Waterworks Company (1875) L.R. 
20 Eq. 474 per Jessel M.R and, more recently, Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd v Newman (CA) approving of 
this statement. 
13 See Russell v Wakefield Waterworks Company, ibid, for an early example. 
14 Note that the article will often refer only to the wrongdoer control requirement rather than general 
meeting incapability. It is clear that wrongdoer control is only one, although the most prevalent, example 
of general meeting incapability. Where the article refers only to wrongdoer control it is used as shorthand 
for general meeting incapability.  
15 [1988] Ch 114. 
16 Ibid 185. 
17 [1995] 1 BCLC 243. 
18 [2002] 1 BCLC 336. 
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action, but simply an example of a case where there will be no relevant wrongdoer 
control’. 
At common law derivative actions can only be brought in relation to certain 
wrongs which, disloyally, serve the directors’ personal interests. This category of 
wrongs, often referred to in the cases as ‘fraud’, encompass breaches of duty 
which result in loss for the company and gain for the breaching director.   In a 
classic statement of the rule in Burland v Earle, the Privy Council observed that the 
exception was applicable in relation to wrongs of a ‘fraudulent character’ where 
‘the majority are endeavouring directly or indirectly to appropriate to 
themselves money, property, or advantages which belong to the company, or in 
which the other shareholders are entitled to participate’.19  Such wrongs are often 
said to be non-ratifiable wrongs. As noted above, Foss also viewed the inability to 
ratify as a consideration that would support the bringing of a derivative action – 
because in such circumstances there would be no concern that court action could 
be undermined by shareholder ratification.  
But what wrongs are not ratifiable in English law? Commentators20 and 
judges21 have long complained about the absence of clarity in relation to what 
amounts to a non-ratifiable wrong. The reason for this is that in English law, 
outside of an ultra vires or illegal act such as the giving of unlawful financial 
assistance, there is no such category, if such category is constituted solely by the 
character of the wrong.22 Although the proposition that there is such a category 
has garnered academic support over the years23 it is a proposition unfounded on 
authority.24 It is a category of wrongs that has been unable to specify which 
wrongs fall within it.  If close attention is paid to the cases which are said to stand 
for specific non-ratifiable wrongs, most importantly Cook v Deeks where directors 
appropriated for themselves a corporate opportunity, we see that the reason that 
the general meeting could not ratify the wrong was that the general meeting was 
controlled by the wrongdoing directors, and to allow ratification would therefore 
                                                     
19 [1902] AC 83.  Vinelott J in Prudential Assurance v Newman [1980] 2 All ER 841 questioned the extent to 
which Burland v Earle actually considered there to be a wrong-based restriction on the bringing of a 
derivative action. 
20 Gower and Davies (8th eds) 588. 
21 Airey v Cordell at [2006] EWHC 2728 at [44].   
22 See S. Worthington, 'Corporate Governance: remedying and ratifying directors' breaches' (2000) 116 LQR 
638 rejecting the ratifiable / non-ratifiable distinction. Support for this also position is found in Vinelott 
J's first instance judgment in Prudential Assurance v Newman [1980] 2 All ER 841.   
23 See, for example, K. Wedderburn 'Derivative Actions and Foss v Harbottle' (1981) 44 MLR 202 where Lord 
Wedderburn argues in relation to Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 A.C. 83, 93 (incorrectly in this author's view – see 
further below) that 'the basis of the decision was the nature of the misappropriation, not the fact that the 
directors voted as shareholders in the fruitless attempt to ratify the wrong' (emphasis in original). 
24 Limited support is available from Kaye v Croydon Tramways Company [1898] 1 Ch 358 where Vaughan 
Williams LJ observed 'that there are matters which are intra vires, but yet are of such a character that the 
majority cannot bind the minority, even though the notice might itself be in due form' (emphasis 
supplied); although no attempt is made to detail such matters. Support can also be found in statements 
that assume the existence of such a category without regard to authority that establishes that category. See 
for example Lord Millett's recent decision in Waddington v Chan [2009] 2 BCLC 82. The 2006 Act (section 
239(7)) explicitly retains 'any rule of law as to acts that are incapable of being ratified by the company'. 
Such provision should be read as being applicable to ultra vires acts (internally) and unlawful acts such as 
unlawful financial assistance.  
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have been to ‘allow the majority to oppress the minority’.25 That is, the 
characteristic of non-ratifiability is not related to the nature of the wrong alone 
but, in addition, to the control of the general meeting by the wrongdoer. An 
important corollary of this position is that a wrong that could not be ratified by a 
meeting carried by the wrongdoer could be ratified by a meeting in which his votes 
and/or influence do not carry the meeting.  
This is not to say that the nature of the wrong is irrelevant. The authorities 
stand for the proposition that actions that are disloyal and directly benefit the 
wrongdoer at the expense of the company cannot be ratified where the votes of the wrongdoer 
carry the meeting. A breach of duty that does not both benefit the director personally 
and result in a loss for the company could, therefore, be ratified by a vote carried 
by the wrongdoing director’s votes.26 It is noteworthy in this regard that in Burland 
v Earle the ‘fraudulent character’ restriction is a product of the holding that  a 
derivative action cannot be brought where it is ‘capable of being confirmed by the 
majority’ (emphasis supplied). Such a position is consistent with the proper plaintiff 
rule: in relation to such wrongs, even where there is wrongdoer control, the 
company is capable of acting.  
Around 1950, the ‘fraud’ and wrongdoer control restrictions were grouped 
into an exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle known as ‘the fraud on the 
minority’ exception.27  Prior to 1950 the cases did not refer to the ‘fraud on the 
minority’ exception. Today, it would typically be said the fraud on the minority 
exception involves two propositions: first, the wrong must be a non-ratifiable28 
wrong or a wrong that falls within a category of ‘fraud’; and second there must be 
wrongdoer control of the general meeting.29 Through the lens of this exception, 
wrongdoer control is understood as part of the fraud on the minority exception 
and, typically, subsequent to the determination of ‘fraud’ although in many 
                                                     
25 Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 A.C. 554, 564 where the Privy Council also observed 'if directors have acquired for 
themselves property or rights which they must be regarded as holding on behalf of the company, a 
resolution that the rights of the company should be disregarded in the matter would amount to forfeiting 
the interest and property of the minority of shareholders in favour of the majority, and that by the votes of 
those who are interested in securing the property for themselves. Such use of voting power has never been 
sanctioned by the Courts' (emphasis added). By implication, such a resolution would be effective if it was 
not passed by 'votes of those who are interested in securing the property for themselves'. 
26 North West Transportation Company Limited v Beatty (1887) 12 App Cas 589; Regal (Hastings) v Gulliver [1942] 1 
All ER 378.  
27 Edward v Halliwell [1950] 2 All E.R. Prior to 1950 the cases did not refer to the ‘fraud on the minority’ 
exception. See K.W. Wedderburn, ‘Shareholders Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1957) CLJ 
194203-204; Edward v Halliwell [1950] 2 All E.R.  
28 Note that if the term non-ratifiable wrong is used then wrongdoer control is applied twice as wrongdoer 
control is part of the determination of when the wrong is not ratifiable.  
29 See Gower, 6th eds 673-674. 
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important early cases wrongdoer control was the first,30 and in some the only, 
consideration.31  
The language and order of rule and exception misleads us into seeing all the 
rules that form ‘the exception’ as separable and distinct from the proper plaintiff 
rule. Through this lens, the proper plaintiff rule becomes merely a rebuttable 
presumption32 and it follows from this that the substantive rules which determine 
if the presumption can be rebutted – including wrongdoer control - can be 
abolished or amended whilst leaving the proper plaintiff rule intact.33  This is 
incorrect and not supported by authority. The proper plaintiff rule as set forth in 
Foss v Harbottle and its progeny is a substantive rule of law34 that is umbilically 
connected to the wrongdoer control rule, which is merely one example of a 
circumstance in which the company is not capable of acting.  The common law 
proper plaintiff rule provides that where the corporate organs are 'capable' of 
acting in the corporate interest there can be no derivative action. Only when those 
organs are incapacitated, by, for example, wrongdoer control of the general 
meeting, can such an action be brought.  Accordingly, if one were to allow 
derivative actions in the absence of either wrongdoer control or some other form 
of general meeting incapability then the common law proper plaintiff rule would 
no longer be applicable.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
30 Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 (PC). See also, Russell v Wakefield Waterworks Company (1875) L.R. 20 Eq. 474. 
More recent courts were also equivocal about the relationship between wrongdoer control and proper 
plaintiff rule and the fraud on the minority exception. See, for example, Barrett v Duckett [1995] 1 BCLC 
243, where the wrongdoer control exception is presented as a stand alone exception. 
31 Law Commission Consultation Document on Shareholder Remedies, paras 4.12-4.16. For this order of 
presentation see Gower and Davies (6th Edition); Kershaw, above n. 1 at 549 and J. Lowry and A. 
Dignam, Company Law (2nd eds, OUP 2003). The case typically cited for this view of the fraud on the 
minority exception and the position of wrongdoer control is Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 
where Jenkins LJ observed that: 'it has been further pointed out that where what has been done amounts 
to what is generally called in these cases a fraud on the minority and the wrongdoers are themselves in 
control of the company, the rule is relaxed in favour of the aggrieved minority' (restated in the leading 
case of Prudential Assurance v Newman [1982] 1 All ER 354 observing that: 'there is an exception to the rule 
where what has been done amounts to fraud and the wrongdoers are themselves in control of the 
company.' The Law Commission observes that the rules 'was authoritatively stated by Jenkins LJ in 
Edwards v Halliwell' (para 4.35, Consultation Document). 
32 Jenkins LJ in Edwards v Halliwell, ibid observes that 'the proper plaintiff in an action in respect of a wrong 
alleged to be done to a corporation is, prima facie, the corporation' (emphasis added). 
33 See the presentation of the rules and exceptions in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (no.2) 
[1982] Ch 204 where the rules and exceptions are listed (1) – (5) with wrongdoer control only mentioned 
in (5). Deleting 5 in this presentation does not affect (1). 
34 Konamaneni and others v Rolls-Royce Industrial Power (India) Ltd [2002] 1 BCLC 336 where Lawrence Collins J 
(as he then was) observed that 'Gower (p 665) goes as far as to say that the basic rule in Foss v Harbottle is 
part of the law of civil procedure, although it is not easy to see how the basic rule stated in Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] 1 All ER 354 at 357, [1982] Ch 204 at 210 that 'A 
cannot, as a general rule, bring an action against B to recover damages or secure other relief on behalf of 
C for an injury done by B to C' can be regarded as a merely procedural rule'. 
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B. POST-WRONGDOER CONTROL / FRAUD ON THE MINORITY HURDLES 
 
As we have seen, underpinning the common law derivative action rules is an 
understanding that in the absence of an ‘independent’ general meeting there is no 
corporate body capable of acting truly independently in the corporate interest in 
relation to the litigation decision against directors. In such circumstances an 
exception is made to the rule that the company is the only possible plaintiff. 
However, although allowing an individual shareholder to bring an action addresses 
the independence problem it does not provide any guarantee that the individual 
shareholder’s decision to bring the action, and her management of the action, will 
be in the corporate interest.  In Prudential Assurance Co. v Newman Industries Ltd35 the 
Court of Appeal held that whether a derivative action could be brought must be 
dealt with at a preliminary hearing at which the court would determine: (i) whether 
the company was ‘prima facie […] entitled to the relief claimed’; and (ii) whether 
‘prima facie’ ‘the action [fell] within the proper boundaries of the exception to the 
rule in Foss v Harbottle’. The proper boundaries of the exception were not set forth 
in the Prudential judgment with any precision, however, it is clear from the case a 
court should first, establish whether the company is incapable of acting for itself 
and second, determine whether it is in the corporate interest to allow such 
litigation to continue. In Prudential, of particular concern was the fact that an 
independent and disinterested board had determined that the action ‘would do 
more harm than good’ and could kill the company with kindness.  
In subsequent cases a set of common law rules emerged which, in different 
guises, assessed whether the proposed derivative action was in the corporate 
interest. It is important to note that these rules are distinct from the threshold and 
elemental requirement that a derivative action is simply unavailable in the absence 
of general meeting incapacity, resulting from wrongdoer control or otherwise. 
These rules assist the court in determining whether a derivative action, which is 
formally available, is in the company’s interest and whether the derivative litigant is 
the appropriate person to bring the action. As Lawton LJ observed in Nurcombe v 
Nurcombe:36 
 
Since the procedural device has evolved so that justice can be done for the 
benefit of the company, whoever comes forward to start the proceedings 
must be doing so for the benefit of the company and not for some other 
purpose. It follows that the court has to satisfy itself that the person coming 
forward is the proper person to do so.  
 
The question of whether a derivative litigant is acting in the corporate interest 
could be approached subjectively or objectively. A subjective approach looks to 
the bona fides of the party and asks: does that party think he is acting in the 
                                                     
35 [1982] 1 All ER 354. 
36 [1985] 1 ALL ER 65. 
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corporate interest by bringing the derivative litigation? This approach looks for 
any evidence that would suggest that the party has a collateral, non-corporate 
objective which she is furthering through the derivative litigation.  An objective 
approach asks whether, according to a benchmark determined by reference to a 
hypothetical actor such as a reasonable director, the action is actually in the 
corporate interest.  
The pre-2006 Act common law rules on whether it is in the company’s 
interests to bring derivative litigation have gravitated from a subjective approach 
to both and a subjective and an objective approach.  Relying upon Nurcombe v 
Nurcombe, in 1995 the Court of Appeal in Barrett v Duckett37 held that the action will 
only be allowed to proceed if it is brought ‘bona fide for the benefit of the 
company’ and not for any ‘;ulterior purpose’. In Barrett the action was not allowed 
to proceed because, amongst others, although the actions themselves fell within 
the wrongdoer control exception,38 the shareholder was held to be motivated by a 
personal grudge against the director, who was the ex-husband of the shareholder’s 
daughter.  
The rules on permission to continue an action did not require that the action 
be objectively in the corporate interest until shortly before the enactment of 2006 
Act. Arguably, prior to this date there was the functional equivalent of an objective 
test to continue the action because obtaining an indemnification costs order - 
whereby the court orders the company to cover the derivative litigant’s costs- 
required a determination that in the court's view ‘it would have been reasonable 
for an independent board exercising the standard of care which a prudent business 
man would exercise in his own affairs to continue the action to judgment’.39 In the 
absence of an indemnification order few litigants would have taken the risk of 
continuing to judgment where they would bear all legal costs if unsuccessful but 
would gain only a proportionate indirect benefit as a shareholder if successful. In 
Mumbray v Lapper40 and Airey v Cordell41 this objective prerequisite to obtaining an 
indemnity order was extended to the question of whether a derivative action 
would be permitted to continue. Warren J in Airey v Cordell held that ‘the correct 
test for allowing the action to continue and for costs too is to be the independent 
board test’ which he understood to involve asking whether the decision is one 
‘which a reasonable board could take’.  
A third approach to determining corporate interest is to rely upon the views 
of the independent members of the corporate organs. For example, in Prudential 
Assurance for the Court of Appeal the fact that the disinterested board had elected 
not to pursue the litigation would have been a weighty consideration for a court 
                                                     
37 [1995] 1 BCLC 243. 
38 In this case the claimants and defendant both held 50% of the shares in the company and therefore 
although there was no wrongdoer control the general meeting was disabled. There was not discussion of 
whether the wrongs fell within the fraud category, however, it appears clear on the facts of the case that 
they did.  
39 Wallersteiner v Moir (No.2) [1975] 2 WLR 389 per Buckley LJ. 
40 [2005] EWHC 1152. 
41 [2006] EWHC 2728. 
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considering a preliminary application. For Knox J in Smith v Croft (No.2) ‘the views 
of the rest of the minority as to the advisability of the prosecution’ were relevant 
to the determination of whether the litigation ‘will be more productive of harm 
than good’.42  
Finally, although a source of some contention, it seems that at common law 
the courts will have regard to the availability of an alternative remedy in making 
their decision, even though the alternative remedy does not itself have a direct 
effect on wrongdoer control.  In Barrett v Duckett43 for example, the Court of 
Appeal appeared to accept that availability of an unfair prejudice action was 
relevant to their determination of whether or not to allow the litigation to proceed.   
 
 
 
III THE NEW DERIVATIVE CLAIM 
 
The derivative claim rules set forth in Part 11 of the Companies Act 2006 do not 
explicitly purport to abolish or supersede the Rule in Foss v Harbottle.  The Act 
provides that a derivative claim can only be brought in accordance with the Act44 
and removes any wrong-based restriction by providing that a claim may be 
brought in relation to any breach of duty, negligence, default or breach of trust by 
the director.45 The 'fraud' precondition to the ‘fraud on the minority’ exception 
has clearly, therefore, been abolished. This in itself is a notable change, which 
increases the exposure of directors to liability for breaches of the duty of care.  
Once an action has been commenced the derivative claimant must apply to 
court for permission to continue the litigation just as under the old rules a litigant 
had to obtain permission to bring a derivative action in a preliminary hearing.  The 
Act provides for two stages of the permission process. At the first stage the court 
must determine on the evidence filed with the application whether there is a 
‘prima facie case for giving permission’. In the second stage, where the permission 
decision is made, evidence from the company will also typically be admissible.46  
The Act sets forth criteria which in some instances determine the court's decision 
and in others provide guidelines for courts to consider when exercising discretion 
about whether the claim should continue.  Pursuant to section 263(2) of the Act 
the court must discontinue the claim when the shareholder body has ratified or 
authorised the breach. In such circumstances there is no claim, the breach having 
been cured. Section 263(2) also provides that permission must be refused ‘if the 
court is satisfied that a person acting in accordance with section 172 (which is the 
duty to promote the success of the company) would not seek to continue the 
claim’.  
                                                     
42 [1987] 3 All ER 909, 957. 
43 [1995] 1 BCLC 243. 
44 Section 260(2) Companies Act 2006. 
45 Section 260(3) Companies Act 2006. 
46  262(3) and (4) Companies Act 2006. 
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If the breach has not been ratified or authorised and the court is not of the 
view that a hypothetical director would not seek to discontinue the claim, then the 
Act provides the court with discretion as to whether such an action should be 
permitted to continue. The Act sets forth seven non-exclusive factors for the court 
to consider:47 the good faith of the derivative litigant; ‘the importance that a 
person acting in accordance with section 172 would attach to continuing’ the 
claim; whether the proposed action is likely to be authorised, or the alleged breach 
is likely to be ratified; whether the company has elected not to pursue the claim; 
whether the member has an alternative personal remedy; and the views of the 
disinterested members on the derivative litigation. 
Nowhere in the Act is the proper plaintiff rule or its corollary, wrongdoer 
control, mentioned as a consideration or as a precondition to being able to bring a 
derivative claim. Given the prominence of wrongdoer control to the common law 
rules, the Act's silence in this regard is widely thought to have abolished this 
requirement.  Professor Davies observes, for example, that ‘Foss v Harbottle is thus 
consigned to the dustbin’.48 Arad Reisberg observes that ‘the previous rules in Foss 
and other cases will not be directly relevant’ and ‘the claimant does not need to 
show wrongdoer control’.49 This author has previously observed that ‘the new 
statutory derivative claim in effect overrules the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’.50 In Iesini v 
Westrip Holdings Ltd51 Lewison J observed that ‘the new code has replaced the 
common law derivative action’.52 For the Inner House in Wishart v Castlecroft 
Securities Ltd,53 wrongdoer control was not ‘repeated’ in the Act and, therefore, is 
no longer part of derivative action law.  For Roth J in Bamford v Harvey, following 
the Inner House in Wishart,54 ‘wrongdoer control is not an absolute condition for 
a derivative claim’. 
This stance on the relationship between the prior common law rules and Part 
11 is primarily based upon statutory silence and the view that the Act was intended 
                                                     
47  Sections 263(3) and (4) Companies Act 2006. 
48 Gower and Davies (8th eds) 615. Gower and Davies also observe that 'under the statutory procedure 
permission to continue the litigation can be granted by the court even if the alleged wrongdoers are not in 
control of the general meeting'. See also Kershaw, above n.1 at 551 observing that the new procedure 
represent 'a profound change in UK company law'.  
49 A. Reisberg, 'Derivative Claims Under the Companies Act 2006: Much Ado About Nothing'' in J. Armour 
& J. Payne (eds) Rationality in Company Law: Essays in Honour of D.D. Prentice (Hart Publishing, 2009) at [ ] 
and note 224.  See also A. Keay and J. Loughrey, 'Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed: 
An Analysis of the New Derivative Action under the Companies Act 2006' (2008) LQR 469. 
50 D. Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (1st eds, OUP, 2009) 551.  
51 [2009] EWHC 2526 at [73]. 
52 Apart from the cases considered directly in this Part, the cases to date dealing with claims under Part 11 
have largely not considered the status of the proper plaintiff rule and the wrongdoer control requirement 
under the Act. In most of these cases the alleged wrongdoers controlled the general meeting. This is 
clearly the case in Parry v Bartlett [2011] EWHC 3146 (Ch); Franbar Holdings Lts v Patel [2008] EWHC 1534; 
Kiani v Cooper [2010] 2 BCLC 427; Stainer v Lee [2010] ALL ER (D) 56; Kleanthous v Paphitis [2011] EWHC 
2287. The position is unclear from the facts in Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd [2010] All ER (D) 108 and 
Mission Capital plc v Sinclair [2008] All ER (D) 225. 
53 [2009] CSIH 65. 
54 [2012] EWHC 2858 (Ch). 
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to implement the Law Commission’s proposals on Shareholder Remedies55 - 
which recommended the abolition of the fraud on the minority exception - as well 
as, for the academic commentary in particular, upon certain ministerial statements 
about the new procedure which are presumed to be admissible evidence of 
Parliamentary intent.56 We consider the mischief addressed by the Act and the 
admissibility of these ministerial statements below in Part V of this article. Placing 
these materials and their admissibility to one side, the Act itself allows of an 
alternative, and largely unexplored, interpretation of the relationship between Part 
11 and the common law. A relationship of continuity and codification, not 
abolition and a new beginning. A relationship which is suggested in different ways 
by several recent judgments. It is also suggested by other evidence of mischief and 
those same ministerial statements.   
Consider, for example, Cinematic Finance v Ryder.57 In this unusual case in 
which the majority shareholder attempted, unsuccessfully, to bring a derivative 
action, the court recognised that ‘proceedings for a derivative claim are now 
comprehensively governed by the Act’. However, in his judgment Roth J also 
observes that Part 11 has not dislodged the proper plaintiff rule as the 
fundamental principle of English derivative action law. Roth J quotes from 
Prudential Assurance Company Limited v Newman Industries’ explanation of the 
‘elementary’58 proper plaintiff principle, cites the Law Commission’s view that the 
proper plaintiff is a guiding principle of the law, and observes that: 
 
In my judgment the Act is not seeking to change the basic rule that a claim 
that lies in a company can be pursued only by the company or to disturb the 
fundamental distinction between a company and its shareholders. There is 
nothing to suggest that the Act intended such a radical reversal of long-
standing and fundamental principles.  
 
This view echoes the position set forth in the Explanatory Notes to the Company Law 
Reform Bill, considered in greater depth below, which observed that: ‘the [new 
derivative claim] clauses do not formulate a substantive rule to replace the rule 
in Foss v Harbottle’. Roth J affirmed the view set forth in Cinematic Finance in the 
recent case of Bamford v Harvey.59  If Roth J is correct that the proper plaintiff rule 
survives the 2006 Act's reforms we need to think carefully about the substantive 
content of such a proper plaintiff rule and its relationship to wrongdoer control.  
In Bamford v Harvey itself Roth J concluded that it is possible to maintain the 
proper plaintiff rule as a ‘guiding principle’, and yet to abolish wrongdoer control 
as a threshold condition. Had wrongdoer control been retained, he observed, it 
                                                     
55 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Final Report). See, for example, Reisberg above n 49. See Wishart 
ibid, at [3] and [39]. 
56 See Cabrelli below n. 64 and Reisberg, above n. 49. 
57 [2010] EWHC 3387. 
58 [1982]1 Ch 204 at 210[ D-E]. 
59 [2012] EWHC 2858. 
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would have been specified in section 263(2). The problem with this conclusion, 
however, is that it is logically inconsistent with the holding in Cinematic Finance, 
affirmed in Bamford v Harvey, that Part 11 does not alter the ‘elemental’ and ‘basic’ 
proper plaintiff rule. This is because, as we observed above, at common law 
wrongdoer control is not a detachable part of the proper plaintiff rule, but 
inextricably linked to it.  The rule provides that no shareholder can bring an action 
if the company, operating though its general meeting, is 'capable' of doing so. It 
follows from this rule that in the absence of wrongdoer control, or some other 
unusual circumstance disabling the general meeting, the corporate organs retain 
sole authority to make the litigation decision. There can be no recourse to 
derivative litigation in such circumstances. If a derivative action can be brought 
where the general meeting is capable of doing so, then the proper plaintiff rule, as 
a ‘longstanding and fundamental principle’ of the common law, is no longer part 
of English derivative action law.   
Roth J is aware of the relationship between the proper plaintiff rule and 
whether the company is capable of acting, which is why, although he holds that 
wrongdoer control is not a threshold condition, he holds that that is still a relevant 
consideration in exercising the permission discretion. In doing so he appears to 
elevate wrongdoer control to something approaching a threshold condition.60 We 
will consider this conclusion in more detail below in Part VI. For now, note first, 
Roth J’s understanding of the relationship between the proper plaintiff rule, 
corporate capability and wrongdoer control, and second, that his rejection of 
wrongdoer control as a threshold condition is driven, in part, by a view of section 
263(2) which is shown below to be incorrect.  
Uncertainty surrounding the status of proper plaintiff rule and wrongdoer 
control is present in other post-Act derivative claim judgments.  In Wishart v 
Castlecroft Securities, a Scottish case, at first instance Lord Glennie provided that 
wrongdoer control was a threshold condition to be considered at stage one of the 
permission process, in the absence of which there would be no need to consider 
any of the factors set forth in section 26361 of the Act. Such a requirement was, he 
observed, ‘implicit in the nature of derivative proceedings’ which is consistent with 
the view that the proper plaintiff rule remains applicable and that its corollary is 
wrongdoer control.62 On Appeal, Lord Reed in the Inner House reversed this 
holding observing that ‘one of the objects of the 2006 Act was to introduce more 
flexible criteria than the former "fraud on the minority" exception to the rule in 
                                                     
60 For Roth J as for Judge Pelling QC in Stimpson, wrongdoer control can be taken into account simply 
through the exercise of the judge’s section 263(3) discretion. Section 263(3) provides for a non-exhaustive 
list of considerations. In refusing permission to continue the action he appears to concludes that although 
wrongdoer control is not a threshold condition the absence of wrongdoer control will typically result in 
permission being refused: ‘It is not elevating "wrongdoer control" to a preclusive condition for the court 
to hold that when proceedings can clearly be brought in the name of the company and there is no 
objection raised on that ground, they should be brought in the name of the company’. 
61 The Act provides a separate but substantively identical procedure in Scottish cases. The '263 criteria' are 
set forth in section 268.  
62 [2010] B.C.C. 161, [27]. Lord Glennie also observed that the statutory rules 'are clearly informed by the 
prior English practice developed before the Act in case law and in Rules of Court' at [24]. 
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Foss v Harbottle’ and that ‘the requirement of “wrongdoer control” is not repeated 
in section [263]’.63 The Inner House's conclusion that the wrongdoer control 
requirement has been abolished was the product of its absence from the Act 
coupled with a view that the mischief of the Act was based on the Law 
Commission’s view of the problems associated with the common law, and that the 
Act implemented the Commission's recommendation to replace the 'fraud on the 
minority exception'.64 The Inner House’s view of the relationship between the 
Commission’s report and the Act was adopted by Roth J in Bamford v Harvey. But it 
is a view, which as we shall see below, is contestable.    
In Stimpson v Southern Private Landlords Association65 the Court briefly considered 
the status of wrongdoer control. Judge Pelling QC in response to a submission 
that wrongdoer control was no longer relevant indicated that it would be a 
relevant consideration. He observed that: 
 
Under the old law if there was no wrongdoer control of the company, 
permission would be refused for the obvious reason that in the circumstances 
there was no need for derivative proceedings to be commenced. It was 
submitted on behalf of the Claimant that these principles do not appear in the 
statute and therefore are no longer relevant. I am doubtful if that is correct.  
 
For Judge Pelling QC the fact that there was no wrongdoer control in this case 
was ‘at least a powerful [consideration] that negatives the giving of permission and 
may be overwhelming’. But for Judge Pelling QC wrongdoer control is not a pre-
section 263 threshold consideration, rather, as it was for Roth J in Bamford v 
Harvey, it is an additional consideration which may be considered by the court by 
virtue of the non-exclusive nature of section 263(3).  
These cases raise the question of the post-Act status of the proper plaintiff 
rule: whether it is possible and correct to read the Act as simply providing a clearer 
and more accessible procedure for the application of the common law rules, 
including an absolute requirement to show wrongdoer control or other corporate 
incapability; and, if not, in what way is it possible to effectively and coherently take 
account of the proper plaintiff rule through Part 11. Importantly, the exploration 
of this question should not be truncated by the rejection in Wishart and in Bamford 
of a wrongdoer control threshold condition. Wishart, followed in Bamford, was 
                                                     
63 Ibid [38]. 
64 Ibid [3] observing that 'the recommendations of the Law Commission formed the basis of […] a new 
legislative framework for derivative claims in England and Wales'. In the Law Commission's Final Report 
on Shareholder Remedies at [1.13] the Commission observes that 'more modern, flexible and accessible 
criteria for leave to bring a derivative action would replace the current "fraud on the minority" exception'. 
See also D. Cabrelli, ‘Statutory Derivative Proceedings: The View from the Inner House’ (2010) 14 The 
Edinburgh Law Review 116 arguing that the Inner House’s rejection of Lord Glennie’s position on 
wrongdoer control ‘was correct […] for the reasons previously advanced by this author, namely that 
Parliament had intended to remove the requirement to establish wrongdoer control which existed at 
common law’. 
65 [2009] EWHC 2072 [46]. 
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based upon a flawed understanding of the status of the Commission report as 
evidence of the mischief at which the statute was aimed and a failure to explore 
whether such a threshold condition could be compatible with Part 11 and in 
particular its omission from section 263(2).  We explore these issues below. The 
starting point must be with the Act itself. 
 
 
 
IV WRONGDOER CONTROL: IN SEARCH OF LEGISLATIVE 
IMPLICATION 
 
What is the best reading of Part 11 of the Act? Does it abolish the Rule in Foss v 
Harbottle and the corporate incapability / wrongdoer control requirement? Or in 
the alternative can it be read persuasively as merely the provision of a codified 
procedure for the application of the pre-existing common law rules, including 
both the wrongdoer control requirement and the corporate interest 
considerations? In the first instance we must engage with this question without 
any regard to anything we might think ‘we know’ about the mischief addressed by 
the Act or what Parliament intended as evidenced by the statements of ministers 
during the passing of the Bill. The later only becomes relevant where the statutory 
language is deemed to be ambiguous or obscure. The former, although part of the 
context of the interpretative process, in this instance provide limited assistance. At 
best, as we consider in detail below, analysis of the documents that could identify 
the mischief addressed by the Act suggest a bias in favour of continuity.   
 
A. GENERAL INFERENCES 
 
The enactment of a statute that addresses activity subject to common law rules 
does not replace those common law rules unless such rules are abrogated expressly 
or impliedly by the statute. Lord Browne-Wilkinson in R v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Ex Parte Pierson, made the following observations in this regard: 
 
It is well established that Parliament does not legislate in a vacuum: statutes 
are drafted on the basis that the ordinary rules and principles of the common 
law will apply to the express statutory provisions. As a result, Parliament is 
presumed not to have intended to change the common law unless it has 
clearly indicated such intention either expressly or by necessary implication.66 
                                                     
66  [1998] AC 539.  Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th edn), at 116 cited by Lord Brown-Wilkinson 
observes that: 'it is presumed that the legislature does not intend to make any change in the existing law 
beyond that which is expressly stated in, or follows by necessary implication from, the language of the 
statute in question.' See also, Beattie v Royal Bank of Scotland [2003] SCLR 352, [35] for an example of 
relying on this presumption to find that a statute does not alter the prior common law position which 
would have amounted to 'a significant change in existing (and longstanding) law'. For earlier authority see 
further Harrison v Tew [1990] 2 AC 523, 536 observing that 'the common law can co-exist with a statutory 
provision with which it is not inconsistent' and approving of the observation of Coke's Institutes of the 
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As the Companies Act 2006 makes no express statement about the status of the 
common law rules, if the common law proper plaintiff rule and wrongdoer control 
requirement have been abolished then we must identify such a change in the law 
by ‘necessary implication’. In the context of the interpretation of statutes creating 
criminal offences and the presumption that mens rea is required for conviction of a 
criminal offence, Lord Nicholls in B (a minor) v DPP observed that ‘"necessary 
implication" connotes an implication which is compellingly clear’.67 This view has 
been adopted outside of the criminal law context.68 Lord Nicholls noted further 
that such implication could be found in the language used in the statute and the 
mischief of the statute. In this section we focus only on the language of the 
statute69 and return to the mischief in Part V.  
A strong argument for the implied abrogation of the proper plaintiff rule is 
that by providing that derivative claims can ‘only be brought’ in accordance with 
Part 1170 that the Act replaces the common law rules, leaving the Act’s provisions 
as the exclusive point of reference for considering the permissibility of derivative 
claims. This is the position taken by Lewison J in Iesini v Westrip Holdings.71 This 
leaves no room for the continuing application of the proper plaintiff rule as it is 
not referred to in Part 11.  
A counterargument is that the Act simply provides a procedure for derivative 
claims that are capable of being ‘brought’. That is, it codifies only those common 
law rules that apply once a determination that the general meeting is incapable of 
acting has been made. If the general meeting is capable of acting, the claim cannot 
be 'brought' at all.  Under the pre-Act position, pursuant to the applicable Civil 
Procedure Rules claimants were required ‘to apply to the court for permission to 
continue the claim’.72 Whilst this is very similar to the approach taken by the Act, 
these rules did not specify the considerations courts were required to take into 
account. In practice, on this application the courts would consider both 
compliance with the threshold company incapability requirement as well as the 
common law corporate interest factors considered in Part II above.73 Part 11, by 
way of contrast with the courts’ pre-Act approach, makes no explicit provision for 
any such procedural threshold determination by the court. This suggests that the 
                                                                                                                                       
Laws of England (1817) 200 that 'it is a maxim of the common law, that a statute made in the affirmative 
does not take away the common law'. See also Greene v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1462 
(CA) at [62] observing that 'first principles in statutory interpretation would also rule out the dismantling 
of judge made law by stealth (in the absence of necessary implication)'.  
67 [2000] 2 AC 238, 464.  
68 See R (on the application of Morgan Grenfell)v Special Commissioner [2001] EWCA Civ 239 (CA) at [15] holding 
that 'the concept of necessary implication connotes an implication which is compellingly clear' in the 
context of whether the Taxes Management Act 1970 overrode legal professional privilege. 
69 Note that for Maxwell in The Interpretation of Statutes above n. 66 cited by Lord Browne-Wilkinson 'the 
necessary implication' must be found in the statutory language alone. 
70  Section 260(2) Companies Act 2006. 
71 See text to note 52. 
72 CPR 19.9(3).  
73 Barrett v Ducket [1995] 1 BCLC 243. 
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proper plaintiff rule has been abolished because it would be baffling for the statute 
to provide for a procedure for derivative claims which presumed that a prior 
threshold determination must be made in a separate, and not provided for, 
procedure.  Accordingly, unless Part 11 provides a procedural place for the proper 
plaintiff rule the inference of abolition is compelling.   
Lord Glennie’s interpretation of the Act in his Outer House ruling in Wishart 
v Castlecroft Securities74 provides for such a place. He holds that the Act makes 
provision for consideration of corporate incapability through the two stage 
process. Stage 175 he holds should involve consideration of whether there is a 
prima facie case on the merits and whether there is ‘a prima facie case that those 
responsible those for that Act or omission are or remain in majority control, thus 
preventing institution of proceedings at the instance of the company’.76  On this 
reading the term ‘prima facie case for giving permission’ does not simply mean 
that there is prima facie case based on the permission criteria in section 263 rather 
it means that in order to move to Stage 2 there must be: (i) a prima facie case on 
the merits; (ii) a prima facie case of wrongdoer control or another form of 
corporate incapability; and (iii) a prima facie case that pursuant to the section 263 
criteria permission would be granted.  A slightly different reading, and one which 
Lord Glennie may well adhere to,77 is that the prima facie determination involves 
only (i) and (ii). This reading suggests that the phrase ‘prima facie case for giving 
permission’ means that in the absence of (i) and (ii) the claim is not capable of 
being brought derivatively at all and therefore is not one in relation to which the 
court should consider whether it should ‘give permission’ in stage 2 of the process. 
This understanding of the meaning of ‘prima facie case’ is derived from the 
pre-Act case law. The preliminary procedure introduced by Prudential Assurance v 
Newman78 used the term ‘prima facie case’ to refer to both (1) a prima facie case on 
the merits and (2) a prima facie case that ‘the action falls within the proper 
boundaries of the exception to the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’.79 In Airey v Cordell, a 
case which has been relied upon in post-Act cases to understand other provisions 
in Part 11,80 relying on this quote Warren J observed that: ‘I note that the 
reference to prima facie case is in relation to (1) and (2)’.81 Under the pre-Act 
                                                     
74 Whilst Lord Glennie's judgment was overruled by the Inner House, the Inner House does not engage 
with this interpretation directly but rather bases their holding on, in their view, the intention of 
Parliament to implement the Law Commission's recommendations and remove the wrongdoer control 
requirement. 
75 Note that the Stage 1 and 2 procedure was introduced as an amendment to the Companies Bill in the 
Lords. See Hansard, 9 May 2006, Column 883 and 889.  
76 [2010] BCC 161,  [27]  
77 Lord Glennie did not extend his approach to include (iii) as well.   
78 [1982] Ch 204. 
79 Ibid at [222]: 'In our view, whatever may be the properly defined boundaries of the exception to the rule, 
the plaintiff ought at least to be required before proceeding with his action to establish a prima facie case 
(i) that the company is entitled to the relief claimed, and (ii) that the action falls within the proper 
boundaries of the exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle.' 
80 See, for example, Iesini v Wetsrip Holdings  [2011] 1 BCLC 498 relying on Airey v Cordell [2006] EWHC 2728 
in interpreting section 263(2)(a) Companies Act 2006. 
81 [2006] EWHC 2728 [45]. For (1) and (2) see (i) and (ii) ibid. 
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process the prima facie case determination applied to both the threshold proper 
plaintiff/corporate capability determination and the post-incapability 
considerations outlined in Part II above. Accordingly, if the term ‘prima facie case’ 
is being used in the Act as it was used in the prior case law then what Stage 1 
includes is a determination of whether there is a prima facie case that the general 
meeting is incapacitated.  
Furthermore, in support of this approach, if Stage 1 does not involve a 
threshold determination it is difficult to understand what the point of Stage 1 is at 
all. If a prima facie case involves the presumption that the facts stated are true, and 
Stage 1 is only designed to consider whether there is a prima facie case based on 
the section 263 criteria, then Stage 1 will only filter out the most incompetently 
drafted applications: an application that states the honestly and good faith of the 
litigant, the existence of a prime facie case on the merits, and asserts the absence 
of substantive business costs for the company must always move to Stage 2.   
Whilst the term prima facie case is meaningful as a proof burden – do the stated 
facts establish a cause of action – it is inapposite if not meaningless for the types 
of considerations set forth in section 263.   
An alternative argument that Part 11 replaces and abolishes all common law 
derivative action rules is provided by the fact that in relation to directors’ duties – 
which the Act codifies82 for the first time and with some controversy – as the 
intention was to provide for the continuing applicability of the common law rules 
the Act explicitly says so.83 Part 11 has no such provision, which could be taken to 
imply that the common law rules do not continue to apply. This is an important 
consideration given the weight placed on the common law meaning of ‘prima facie 
case’ above. Nevertheless, it is readily dismissed. The Act both codifies directors’ 
duties but then makes it clear that the codification is not designed to alter the 
substance of the case law on which the codification is based. By way of contrast, 
Part 11 attempts no codification of the proper plaintiff rule it simply, on the above 
reading, provides a portal for its procedural application through the term ‘prima 
facie case’. On the continuing application of the common law to understand the 
meaning of Part 11, it is noteworthy that the courts in interpreting other aspects of 
Part 11 have relied upon pre-Act cases to understand the meaning of the Act's 
provisions.84  
 
B. SPECIFIC INFERENCES: WRONGDOER CONTROL AND SECTION 263 
 
If there is no conclusive general inference from Part 11 that the proper plaintiff 
rule and its corollary wrongdoer control have been abolished, is such an inference 
                                                     
82  See sections 170-177 Companies Act 2006. 
83 Section 170(3) Companies Act 2006 provides that the duties are 'based' on the common law rules. Section 
170(4) provides that the codified general duties in section 171-177 shall be interpreted in accordance with 
the prior common law rules.  
84  See, for example, Iesini v Wetsrip Holdings [2011] 1 BCLC 498 relying on Airey v Cordell [2006] EWHC 
2728; and Franbar Holdings v Patel [2008] EWHC 1534 relying on Barrett v Duckett [1995] 1 BCLC 243.   
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available from the inconsistency of any of the section 263 considerations with the 
continuing application of such a rule?   
Section 263(2) provides that permission to continue the claim must not be 
granted if the unlawful act has been ratified or authorised or if the action is one 
that a person acting in accordance with section 172 would not seek to continue. If 
the Act had intended to retain wrongdoer control as a bar to the bringing of an 
action wouldn't the legislature have placed it in section 263(2) with the other bars? 
As noted above, Roth J in Bamford v Harvey explicitly relies upon this point in 
holding that wrongdoer control as an ‘absolute condition’ has been abolished. 
However, this inference struggles in the face of the place found for wrongdoer 
control in ‘prima facie case for giving permission’ as well as this section's 
consistency with the former regime.  
Under the common law rules would it have made sense to say that an action 
that ostensibly could have been brought pursuant to the fraud on the minority 
exception – because of both the nature of the wrong and wrongdoer control over 
the general meeting - could not in fact be brought because the wrong had already 
been ratified? Some commentators would say it would not because the fraud on 
the minority exception only applied to non-ratifiable wrongs, which are by 
definition non-ratifiable. However, as argued in Part II of this article, there is no 
such category of wrongs which are of themselves non-ratifiable. All wrongs that 
fell within the fraud on the minority exception were ratifiable, just not with the 
assistance of the votes of the wrongdoer. That is, under the common law rules, 
ratification or authorisation by a disinterested general meeting vote would have 
operated as a bar to a derivative action that complied with the other criteria of the 
fraud of the minority exception, including wrongdoer control. Such ratification or 
authorization – which necessarily must be facilitated by the wrongdoer’s 
abstention - would have cured the wrong, resulting in there being no cause of 
action in relation to which litigation could be brought. One could readily imagine 
circumstances where this could arise. For example, a new minority shareholder 
brings an action against the longstanding and wrongdoing controllers only to 
discover that the former disinterested shareholders have ratified the decision; or 
following commencement of the litigation the remaining disinterested 
shareholders vote in favour of ratification. Accordingly, sections 262(2)(b) and (c) 
may be viewed as a restatement of the prior common law position on effective 
ratification and authorisation even in the presence of wrongdoer control. If the 
same rule was applicable under the pre-Act position its presence in the Act cannot 
be relied upon to draw an implication of the abolition or the wrongdoer control 
requirement.  
The relationship between the corporate interest rule in sections 263(2)(a) and 
263(3)(b) can also be read as a consistent restatement of the common law regime 
as set forth in Mumbray v Lapper85 and Airey v Cordell,86 where corporate interest 
                                                     
85 [2005] EWHC 1152. 
86 [2006] EWHC 2728. 
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becomes a consideration following the establishment of wrongdoer control. Warren 
J observed in Airey v Cordell that the court should only exercise its discretion to 
prevent the bringing of a derivative action where it is clear that the board would 
not grant permission to continue: ‘where no board acting reasonably could decide 
to take proceedings’. Section 263(2) could be read as a procedural restatement of 
this position.  It is noteworthy in this regard that courts have adopted Airey v 
Cordell’s approach to the interpretation of section 263(2)(a).87 However, in Airey v 
Cordell Warren J held that once the action could be held as being in the corporate 
interest the court should not prevent the action from proceeding. The Act does 
not adopt this approach and, in section 263(3)(b), allows the court who has 
concluded that a hypothetical director would not 'not seek to continue the claim', 
to continue to have regard to the importance that the hypothetical director would 
attribute to continuing with the litigation. However, this arguably amounts merely 
to a legislative adjustment of the developing common law objective corporate 
interest test and does not imply anything about a prior rule preventing the bringing 
of a derivative claim where there is no wrongdoer control. 
What then of the other discretionary factors in section 263(3) and (4)? The 
requirement that the court consider the bona fides of the derivative litigant is a 
restatement of the similar common law rule.  Accordingly, this rule has nothing to 
stay about the role of wrongdoer control as an ‘ex-ante’ pre-requisite to court 
consideration of this factor. Nor do the rules requiring consideration of likely 
ratification, authorisation and the views of the disinterested shareholders.88 These 
rules provide in effect the same function – they codify the position set forth in 
Smith v Croft (No. 2) and encourage the courts to take account of disinterested 
shareholder views on whether the litigation is in the company’s interest. 
However, sections 263(3)(e) and (f) of the Act create some difficulty for the 
reading of the Act that suggests that the ‘prima facie case’ inquiry in Stage 1 
involves a determination of whether there is wrongdoer control or another form 
of corporate incapability. Subsection (e) requires regard to whether the company 
has decided not to commence litigation and subsection (f) requires regard to 
whether the unlawful act also gives rise to a personal claim of the member as well 
as the derivative claim. If it is correct that the proper plaintiff rule remains 
applicable then obviously the determination of whether there is wrongdoer control 
or some other form of general meeting disability are necessarily prior to the 
corporate interest considerations set forth in 263(3).  However, the consideration 
of the company’s decision about the litigation and the availability of an alternative 
remedy could be interpreted to require consideration of factors that are directly 
concerned with the capability of the company to make a decision about the 
litigation independently of the wrongdoer’s interests. That is, these considerations 
may be interpreted to raise factors that would be addressed by a wrongdoer 
control inquiry. They would not, therefore, make sense as part of an assessment of 
                                                     
87 See, for example, Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd [2011] 1 BCLC 498. 
88 Section 263(3)(c)(d) and (4) Companies Act 2006. 
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whether litigation should continue following a finding of wrongdoer control and, 
accordingly, if such readings are correct, imply abolition.  
Let us take first the consideration of the company’s decision in section 263(e). 
The first question we need to answer is which organs are intended by reference to 
‘the company’. Clearly the board’s decision is the company’s decision. But is a 
general meeting’s decision on the litigation also the company’s decision? At 
common law the answer is a relatively clear ‘yes’. Although some courts, most 
notably Breckland Group Holdings Ltd v London & Suffolk Properties Ltd89 have held 
otherwise and focused only on the distribution of power in the articles (which 
typically would not empower the general meeting to make the decision), most 
courts and commentators are of the view that there is such a reserve power for the 
general meeting. The most important support for this view is, of course, the 
proper plaintiff rule which presumes the reserve power of the general meeting to 
make a litigation decision.90  If the proper plaintiff rule has been abolished then 
without this support it seems probable that the literal constitutional approach 
adopted in Breckland Group Holdings Ltd is correct, which will mean that in nearly all 
companies91  the general meeting will not have the power to make a litigation 
decision for the company and ‘company’ in section 263(3)(e) means only the 
board.92 On the other hand, if the proper plaintiff rule has survived then ‘company 
decision’ in section 263(3)(e) may be interpreted as either the board’s or the 
general meeting's decision. Yet paradoxically, as we shall see below, if ‘the 
company’s’ decision means also the general meeting’s decision then this generates 
perhaps the strongest implication of abolition. 
Courts interpreting this provision to date have viewed it as a means of 
considering the views of the board or a special committee authorised to act on 
behalf of the board.93  If courts were to interpret ‘company’ to mean only the 
board,94 then this provision is clearly consistent with the retention of the proper 
plaintiff rule and wrongdoer control. This consideration may be understood as the 
                                                     
89   [1988] 4 BCC 452. 
90 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 492-493. 
91 We ignore here those exceptionally rare companies whose articles explicitly provide for retention of 
managerial powers by the shareholders or retention of specific power in relation to the litigation decision.  
92 This is distinct from the power to instruct the board to take action (by special resolution according to 
Article 4, Model Articles for Public and Private Companies), which would not amount to the litigation 
decision by the company, but only a decision to instruct the board to take the litigation. This model 
article provision does not provide for a retention of managerial corporate power with the shareholder 
body (although clearly the articles could do so). Formally then, such an instruction is not a decision of the 
company to pursue or not to pursue the litigation.  To see this more clearly, if the shareholder body 
resolves to instruct the board to commence litigation, if the board simply did not act on this instruction 
the shareholders, unless they changed the articles, would not be empowered to commence litigation 
(assuming no reserve power) on behalf of the company as the corporate contract does not provide them 
with that power. Their remedies would be for failure of the directors to comply with the terms of the 
constitution (section 171 Companies Act 2006) or to remove the directors. 
93 Kleanthous v Paphitis [2011] EWHC 2287. 
94 It is noteworthy that, the Explanatory Notes to the Bill at [473] (available at http//: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldbills/034/en/06034x-h.htm#11) refer to three 
ways which litigation may be commenced to the Act including: (i) a board decision to commence 
litigation, (ii) action commenced by a liquidator and (iii) a derivative action. It does not refer to a litigation 
decision made by the general meeting.  
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Act’s attempt to incorporate consideration of the board’s views – even in the 
context of wrongdoer control of the general meeting – weighted according to their 
independence of the directors from the wrongdoers.95 Such a consideration would 
amount to a restatement of the court’s position in Prudential Assurance v Newman 
which viewed the independent board’s decision as a relevant consideration in 
deciding whether to permit the derivative action.96  
Ignoring the conundrum identified above, let us consider the interpretative 
consequences if ‘company decision’ is interpreted to mean the decision of the 
shareholders in general meeting as well as the board’s decision. What sense then 
would it make to consider the decision of the company in general meeting after 
wrongdoer control has been established? If the wrongdoers voted in the decision 
then this would, nonsensically, be akin to taking account of the wrongdoer’s view; 
if the wrongdoers abstained and the meeting voted against the litigation then there 
would be no wrongdoer control and Stage 2 would never have been reached.97 
Accordingly, in providing for consideration of the general meeting’s decision not 
to pursue the claim section 263(3)(e) implies abolition. 
However, whether or not wrongdoer control has been retained or replaced by 
the Act it is clear that requiring consideration of the company’s decision (whether 
the general meeting or the board) is designed not merely to consider the decision 
itself but the make-up and views of the corporate organ when making the 
decision. A board decision effected by the wrongdoers would not be relevant.  
Similarly, if a wrongdoer control threshold requirement is not retained by the Act, 
yet the decision of the general meeting was passed by reason of the votes of the 
wrongdoers then the decision itself would not be a relevant consideration for the 
court, but the makeup of the vote - votes cast, the number of disinterested 
shareholders for or against – would be relevant.  For example, if a vote was taken 
where the controlling wrongdoers voted but the results revealed that a majority of 
the disinterested shareholders voted with the wrongdoers, the decision is relevant 
for the court not because of the actual decision but because it provides 
information about the disinterested shareholders’ position.  When the provision is 
viewed in this way the consideration makes sense even with a wrongdoer control 
threshold requirement. It represents another way provided by the Act for taking 
into account the views of the disinterested minority.  
In summary, section 263(3)(e) generates an implication of abolition if 
company decision means the general meeting’s decision as well as the board’s 
decision. It does not generate an implication of abolition if it means only the 
board’s decision. This implication is softened, however, by the availability of a 
reading of this consideration which is consistent with the retention of wrongdoer 
control. Nevertheless, this reading departs somewhat from the literal reading of 
                                                     
95 The Company Law Review, Developing the Framework (paras 4.129-4.139) recommended a disinterested 
director bar to bringing an action.  
96 [1982] Ch 204, 221. 
97 See text to note 15. 
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the provision which focuses on the decision not the voting make-up of the 
decision. A more fundamental challenge to an implication of abolition arising 
from this provision is that without the proper plaintiff rule a discussion of any 
implication generated by requiring consideration of the general meeting’s litigation 
decision is nonsensical because the general meeting would not have the power to 
make that decision. That is, paradoxically, the implication of abolition is premised 
on its retention. A court burdened with having to unpackage the meaning of this 
section 263(3)(e) would, therefore, struggle to find a clear and compelling 
implication that the proper plaintiff rule and its corollary of wrongdoer control 
have been abolished. 
Subsection (f) also provides support for the view that the wrongdoer control 
requirement had been abolished. This provision is a modified version of the 
‘alternative remedy’ bar to the bringing of a derivative action under the rule in Foss 
v Harbottle. Subsection (f) requires the Courts to consider the existence of an 
alternative action that could be brought in the members own name. As noted 
above, in Konamaneni v Rolls-Royce Industrial Power (India) Ltd98 Lawrence Collins J 
observed that the alternative remedy consideration was ‘not an independent bar to 
a derivative action, but simply an example of a case where there will be no relevant 
wrongdoer control’. That is, the alternative remedy is relevant because it removes 
the actual wrongdoer control problem. In Barrett v Duckett,99 the case generally 
cited for the alternative remedy consideration, one of the alternative remedies 
which was of particular importance to the court was the option of putting the 
company into liquidation, which would have rendered the company subject to 
liquidator and not wrongdoer control. Through this lens, the alternative remedy 
consideration is only relevant to the determination of whether or not there was 
wrongdoer control. If this is correct, and wrongdoer control continues to apply as 
a pre-section 263 threshold condition, then the presence of subsection (f) is 
nonsensical; which by implication suggests that the proper plaintiff rule and its 
corollary, the wrongdoer control requirement, have been abolished. 
Of course, this is a reading that rests heavily on Konamaneni’s understanding of 
the conceptual basis of the alternative remedy consideration. Although in Barratt v 
Duckett it is true that the court focused on the effect of the alternative remedy on 
wrongdoer control, it is also the case that in Barrett v Duckett the court appeared to 
view the availability of the unfair prejudice remedy, as an alternative remedy, as a 
relevant consideration which had no connection to the wrongdoer control 
determination. Subsequent cases gravitated away from Lawrence Collins J's 
‘restricted meaning’100 Furthermore, the Act does not use the language of 
‘alternative remedy’ used by the courts and adopted by the Law Commission’s 
derivative action proposal,101 but rather refers only to the availability of a personal 
                                                     
98 [2002] 1 BCLC 336. 
99 [1995] 1 BCLC 243 (CA), per Peter Gibson LJ. 
100 Airey v Cordell [2006] EWHC 2728 noting that 'Lawrence Collins J was giving a very restricted meaning to 
the there being no alternative remedy'. 
101 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Final Report), [50.7(f)]. 
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claim.  This suggests that if there are two understandings of alternative remedy 
from the case law, section 263(f) has adopted the understanding that is 
unconnected to wrongdoer control. Through this lens, subsection (f) is consistent 
with an pre-Section 263 wrongdoer control determination.  
Based on an interpretation of the provisions in Part 11, although we find 
some limited support for an implication of abolition in section 263(3)(e) can one 
say consistently with Lord Browne-Wilkinson in R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Ex Parte Pierson, that Parliament ‘has clearly indicated’ an intention to 
change this fundamental common law rule? If we extricate from our minds all 
extra-legislative material discussed below about the mischief at which the Act was 
aimed or Parliament's intention as evidenced by Parliamentary debates, can we 
confidently say that the language of the statute provides a ‘compellingly clear’ 
implication of abolition? The Act clearly allows for two possibilities. A literal 
reading of the Act divorced from any understanding of the pre-Act approach 
would provide that permission is a function only of the considerations allowed by 
section 263. However, if one juxtaposes the pre-Act common law rules and civil 
procedure rules next to Part 11 a strong inference is available that - apart from the 
abolition of wrong-based restrictions on the bringing of derivative actions - the 
Act merely provides a procedure for applying the proper plaintiff rule and codifies 
in statute the common law's approach to determining whether, following the 
threshold determination of general meeting capability, allowing the derivative 
action to proceed is in the company's interests.  If rules of statutory interpretation 
create a presumption in favour of continuity which must be rebutted explicitly or 
by compelling clear legislative implication, the case for the continuing application 
of the proper plaintiff rule, as a substantive rule of law, may have it.  
 
 
 
V IN SEARCH OF MISCHIEF AND LEGISLATIVE INTENTION 
 
Principles of statutory interpretation allow the judge to have regard to two sources 
of extra-statutory materials: first, evidence of the mischief which the legislation 
aimed to remedy,102 and, secondly, where the meaning of legislation is ambiguous 
or obscure then, pursuant to the House of Lords’ decision in Pepper v Hart,103 
recourse may be had to ministerial statements made in Parliament during the 
legislative debates.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
102 On the ability of the courts to take into account Law Commission reports for understanding the mischief 
at which the legislation is aimed see Factortame Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport [1990] 2 AC 85, 122 (HL). 
103 [1993] AC 593.  
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A. THE MISCHIEF OF PART 11 
 
In 1592 the Barons of the Exchequer observed that ‘the office of all judges is 
always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief’.104 But to 
suppress the mischief one has to be able to identify the mischief as it was 
understood when the Bill was laid before Parliament. In Black-Clawson International 
Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG105 Lord Reid observed in regard to the 
identification of ‘mischief’ that: 
 
In addition to reading the Act, you look at the facts presumed to be known to 
Parliament which the Bill which became the Act in question was before it, 
and you consider whether there is disclosed some unsatisfactory state of 
affairs which Parliament can properly be supposed to have remedied by the 
Act. 
 
In Black-Clawson a report published months before the Foreign Judgments 
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 was enacted was deemed to have identified 
the mischief of this statute.  The interpretative problem is how to identify whether 
evidence of mischief has indeed been adopted by the executive in drafting the Bill 
and placing it before Parliament. The existence of a pre-Bill report is 
uninformative about mischief unless it can be shown unequivocally that the 
report's view of the mischief was subsequently adopted.106 For the purposes of 
Part 11 there are two primary sources for the identification of mischief: the 
Explanatory Notes to the Company Law Reform Bill and the Law Commission’s report 
on Shareholder Remedies.   
The chronological starting point for identifying the mischief addressed by 
Part 11 is the Law Commission’s 1997 report on Shareholder Remedies. The Lord 
Chancellor’s reference to the Law Commission is unrevealing, requesting merely 
that the Commission ‘carry out a review of shareholder remedies with particular 
reference to […] the rule in Foss v Harbottle and its exceptions’.107 The 
Commission's Consultation paper outlines the main concern to be ‘the complexity 
and obscurity’ of the common law derivative action rules.108 The paper also notes 
that following the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Committees ‘there has been 
much interest in improving the accountability of directors in listed companies’, 
                                                     
104 Heydon's Case 3 Rep. 7b. 
105 [1975] 1 All ER 810, 814.  See also: Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v Comptroller-General of Patents Designs 
and Trademarks [1898] AC 571.  
106 See Assam Railways and Trading Company, Limited v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1935] AC 445. per Lord 
Wright,  noting that 'the Report of the Commissioners is even more removed from value as evidence of 
intention, because it does not follow that their recommendations were accepted' at 458. In Black-Clawson 
International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1975] 1 All ER 810 at 823 per Viscount Dilhorne: 
'if the report of the committee merely contains recommendations, while I think regard may be had to 
them, little weight maybe attached to them, as it does not follow that Parliament has accepted them. 
Parliament may have decided to go further or not as far'. 
107 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies – Consultation  (hereinafter ‘Consultation Report’) [1.2] (available at: 
http//: http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp142_Shareholder_Remedies_Consultation.pdf).  
108 Ibid, [1.4]. 
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however, the report observes further that ‘since the content of director’s duties is 
outside this project, issues as to the accountability of directors or other companies 
are also outside the project’.109 Accordingly, for neither the Government of the 
day nor for the Commission was the effect of the wrongdoer control requirement, 
particularly in relation to listed companies, an initial focal point of concern or 
mischief. The mischief of note was the need to address the complexity and 
obscurity of the existing provisions.  
The recommendations of the Final Report, however, extend beyond 
simplification and transparency.  Inspection of the Final report reveals a 
commitment to abrogate the fraud on the minority exception and to replace it with a 
court controlled process in which the courts are empowered to consider all the 
circumstances. Wrongdoer control was viewed as part of this exception, and 
therefore, for the Law Commission, as part of that abrogation. In the 
Commission's consultation paper, detailed attention was given the practical 
problems associated with determining whether the wrongdoers were in control.110 
The Law Commission recommended that the new procedure ‘replace entirely the 
common law right to bring a derivative action’.111 Although the Commission 
reaffirmed the proper plaintiff rule as a ‘guiding principle of the law on 
shareholder remedies’112 necessarily the abrogation of the wrongdoer control 
requirement involves the abrogation of the proper plaintiff rule as a substantive 
rule of English law. As we noted above, the wrongdoer control requirement is 
umbilically connected to the proper plaintiff rule which enables derivative actions 
only where the general meeting is incapable of acting because of, for example, 
wrongdoer control.  Where the general meeting is capable of functioning, the 
proper plaintiff rule prevents derivative litigation. Pursuant to the Law 
Commission's recommendation the proper plaintiff rule would become a 
presumption or a preference which would be rebuttable even in the absence of 
wrongdoer control – ie., where the conditions for leave were satisfied.113 The Rule 
in Foss v Harbottle was not therefore retained by the Law Commission’s 
recommendations.  
The Explanatory Notes to the Companies Act 2006 observe that Part 11 was not 
intended to be ‘a substantive rule to replace the rule in Foss v Harbottle’. The Notes 
to the Act further observe that ‘it will not be necessary for the applicant to show 
that the wrongdoing directors control the majority of the company’s shares’.114  
However, these Notes are of no relevance to understanding what was intended by 
Parliament or the mischief addressed by the Act. They amount only to post-
                                                     
109 Consultation Report, [1.5]. 
110 Ibid [4.13]. 
111 Final Report, [6.52]. 
112 Law Commission Consultation Paper, [14.11, 14.12] (reaffirmed in the Final Report, [1.9]).  
113 The Law Commission's Final Report, at [6.93]: ‘As we made clear in the consultation paper, in the absence 
of circumstances justifying the grant of leave, we consider that the proper plaintiff principle should apply since, in 
the words of the Court of Appeal in  Prudential it  “[...] is fundamental to any rational system of 
jurisprudence”’ (emphasis added).    
114 Explanatory Notes to the Companies Act 2006, [491]. 
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enactment guidance provided by the Department of Business. As the Inner House 
in Imperial Tobacco Ltd v Lord Advocate115 recently observed with regard to an 
attempt to rely on the Explanatory Notes to the Scotland Act, such notes are prepared 
after the enactment and, therefore, the ‘value of these notes for the purpose of 
interpretation of the statute is very limited’. This is wholly correct as a matter of 
principle. To allow such notes to count as evidence of Parliamentary intent would 
be to transfer power to the Executive to form Parliamentary intent after 
enactment. These notes should, as Lord Hamilton, the Lord President, observed 
‘be regarded merely as a commentary on the provisions’. The weight of any 
commentary stands on the persuasiveness of its arguments. As Explanatory Notes to 
the Act typically provide only statements of position rather than arguments for 
positions they are unlikely to carry much weight. We cannot artificially enhance 
the weight of this commentary by appealing to the fact that such notes are 
prepared by people very close to the legislative process. We do not know: who 
prepared or supervised the preparation of these notes; their level of seniority; the 
time they have spent in the Department or on the Bill; or their understanding of 
the area of law addressed by the statute.  
By way of contrast, the Explanatory Notes to the Company Law Reform Bill are 
relevant to understanding the context and mischief of Part 11.116  In this regard, 
Lord Steyn has extra-judicially observed that: ‘Explanatory Notes will sometimes 
be more informative and valuable than reports of the Law Commission or 
advisory committees, Government green or white papers, and the like’.117 This 
view is particular apposite in the case of Part 11 where there was a considerable 
time delay between the Law Commission’s proposal and the Bill, and where the 
Government appeared to be uncertain during this period as to what to do with the 
proposal, as evidenced by a 2002 White Paper on Modernising Company Law which, 
as Arad Reisberg observes, ‘was somewhat equivocal on these reforms’.118 
The Explanatory Notes to the Bill do not suggest that the mischief addressed by 
the Act was wrongdoer control or that the Act was designed to abolish the proper 
plaintiff rule.  Having set forth the Note's understanding of the common law, 
                                                     
115 [2012] CSIH 9 (Inner House) at [13]. 
116 See Imperial Tobacco Ltd v The Lord Advocate [2012] CSIH 9 (Inner House) at [13] where the Lord President 
observed when rejecting the value of Explanatory Notes to the Act: 'They accordingly do not have the 
interpretative value which explanatory notes which accompany a Bill in its passage through Parliament can 
have because the latter can provide an objective setting or contextual scene for the statute or contain a clear 
assurance by the executive in Parliament about the meaning of the provision', citing Westminister City Council 
v National Asylum Support Service [2002] UKHL 38 at [5]. See Steyn LJ, 'Pepper v Hart: A Reexamination' 
(2001) 21 OLJS 59. Lord Steyn himself suggests that the wording of the notes on a particular clause may be 
admissible against the government where the government attempts to rely on a reading of a statute different 
from what they claimed in Parliament the clause meant. With regard to context and mischief he observes : 
‘Insofar as the Explanatory Notes cast light on the objective setting or contextual scene of the statute, and 
the mischief at which it is aimed, such materials are therefore always admissible aids to construction. They 
may be admitted for what logical value they have’. 
117 Ibid 71, also observing that 'I would expect such documents to be of great assistance to the courts in 
mastering the scheme and structure of sometimes impenetrable legislation'. 
118 See Reisberg above n.49 at [note 30]. Department for Trade and Industry, Modernising Company Law (White 
Paper) (Cm 5553-I). 
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including the ‘fraud’ and wrongdoer control prerequisites,119 the Notes observe 
both that: ‘the clauses do not formulate a substantive rule to replace the rule 
in Foss v Harbottle, but rather a new procedure for bringing such an action which 
set down criteria for the court distilled from the Foss v Harbottle jurisprudence’;120 
and that ‘this Part [does] not seek to overturn the [common law’s] well-established 
principles’.121 In contrast to the Act's Explanatory Notes, there is no mention of the 
fact that it is no longer necessary to demonstrate wrongdoer control. On the 
contrary, the Explanatory Notes to the Bill set out wrongdoer control as an existing 
part of the common law and then proceed to observe that the Bill does not seek to 
overturn the law’s existing principles. For the Notes to the Bill the permission 
procedure is the means by which a shareholder can pursue an action where ‘the 
company is improperly prevented from bringing proceedings’.122  The Notes to 
the Bill refer to the objective of implementing the Law Commission’s 
recommendation that there should be ‘a new derivative procedure with more 
modern, accessible and flexible criteria’. But they do not simply say that Part 11 
implements the Law Commission’s specific reform recommendations.  
Although not admissible evidence of mischief, it is a noteworthy aside that 
there is other evidence to suggest that the view that the Rule in Foss v Harbottle, 
understood as the proper plaintiff rule, was not being amended by the Bill was 
held within the Executive. In a letter to the Financial Times in 2005, Minister Alun 
Micheal provided clarification that although, contrary to prior law, the Bill 
provided for derivative suit in respect of cases of negligence it ‘will not result in a 
major change in the law’.123 
Accordingly, as to the mischief addressed by the Bill there is a direct conflict 
between the Explanatory Notes to the Bill which do not view wrongdoer control or 
the replacement of the common law rules as the mischief addressed by the Act 
and the Law Commission’s recommendations which, if taken as the mischief 
addressed by the statute, do. In support of this understanding of the Notes to the 
Bill's position on continuity there are some important differences between the Bill 
and the Commission’s proposals.124 Perhaps the most noteworthy difference 
between the Commission's proposal and the Act is not one which is relevant to 
this analysis - namely the Stage 1 requirement to establish a ‘prima facie case for 
giving permission’ - as this was introduced in a subsequent amendment to the 
Bill.125 Other differences between the Bill and the Commission’s proposal are 
relevant.  Note in particular that the Commission recommended that the court 
                                                     
119 Explanatory Notes to the Company Law Reform Bill, [474-475] and again in [481].  
120 Explanatory Notes to the Company Law Reform Bill, [480].  
121 Explanatory Notes to the Company Law Reform Bill, [482].  
122 Explanatory Notes to the Company Law Reform Bill, [481].  
123 'Effect in statute for a longstanding shareholder right' A. Michael, 9 November 2005 Financial Times 
(letter). 
124 See R v Allen [1985] AC 1029, 1035 as an example of the comparison of a report's recommended 
changed and the subsequent Act as a relevant factor for determining whether a report provides evidence 
of mischief (which in this case was 'identical'). See also Black-Clawson, above at n. 101 at 823.  
125 See above at. n. 75. 
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considers whether there is an ‘alternative remedy’. As noted above the alternative 
remedy consideration had two aspects at common law. The first was that the 
availability of the alternative remedy meant that there was no wrongdoer control, 
for example, because a liquidator could be appointed. The second was that an 
alternative personal remedy existed for the derivative litigant. As also noted above, 
had the former understanding been retained by the Act then that would support 
the view that the Act has abolished a wrongdoer control requirement.  However, 
the Bill and the Act elected not to take the Commission’s position and focused 
only on the second aspect of the alternative remedy consideration, a position 
which we established in Part IV is consistent with the view that the wrongdoer 
control requirement has not been abolished.  
It is also noteworthy that the Commission’s draft proposals contained a 
demand requirement that provided that prior to being able to commence 
derivative litigation notice must be served on the company setting forth the 
particulars of the claim and informing the company that if it did not bring the 
claim then derivative litigation would be commenced.126 The Commission’s 
proposals would have given the company a 28 day grace period to make the 
litigation decision, during which the derivative claim could not be brought. This 
demand mechanism may be viewed as a different way of giving effect to the idea 
that the proper plaintiff rule is ‘the guiding principle of the law’. The demand 
proposal would have allowed, and provided time for, the company itself to make a 
decision about the enforcement of its rights. It is an acknowledgement that in the 
first instance it is a decision for the company.  But this demand mechanism did 
not make it into the Bill or the Act. Without it, if the common law rules have been 
replaced by the Act, then the Act pays less regard to the proper plaintiff principle - 
and represents a more substantial departure from the common law - than the 
Commission's proposals. That is, less continuity whilst the Notes to the Bill 
professed more continuity. Unless, that is, taking the Notes at their word, it is not 
necessary to provide a different balance between the proper plaintiff principle and 
director accountability, because the Rule in Foss v Harbottle remains in place.   
Given the inconsistency between the Notes to the Bill and Commission’s 
position and proposals, and the Notes chronological proximity to the Bill, one 
cannot take – as Roth J did in Bamford v Harvey and the Inner House did in Wishart 
v Castlecroft Securities - the Commission’s recommendations or proposals as 
evidence that the mischief at which the Act was aimed was to replace the common 
law rules and to abolish the corporate incapability / wrongdoer control 
requirement.   The mischief which we can take from both of these sources is the 
need for a new, modern, flexible and assessable mechanism. But, following the 
Explanatory Notes to the Bill, not one that - apart from the category of wrongs that 
can be subject to derivative claims - alters the prior substantive legal position.   
 
                                                     
126 Law Commission Final Report [6.58-6.60]. The Commission observed that 'the vast majority of 
respondents agreed with the provisional recommendations. Several respondents suggested that 28 days 
was too short' [6.59]. 
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B. WRONGDOER CONTROL AND MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS 
 
1.The scope of Pepper v Hart  
Pursuant to the Rule in Pepper v Hart ministerial statements made in Parliament, 
may be relied on as an interpretative aid where the statutory language is ambiguous 
or obscure. Where admissible, ministerial statements do not determine the 
meaning of the provision in question but form part of the ‘legislative background’ 
to be taken into account when interpreting the provision.127   
The nature of the legislative process means that statements of ministers in 
Parliament as probative evidence of Parliamentary intention must be treated with 
great care. The relationship between intention and a draft bill may not necessarily 
take the form of Intention-Bill-Act. It may often be the case that what amounts to 
the ‘intention’ of a Bill in relation to a specific point of law may not have been 
given careful consideration by any minister or any of her aids prior to the drafting 
of the Bill.128 The ‘intention’ of a Bill as stated in Parliament may, therefore, only 
manifest itself in response to a Parliamentary question once the Bill has been laid 
before Parliament. ‘Intention’ formed in the ‘heat of the question’ may, 
understandably, place pressure on the minister’s command of his brief,129 which in 
turn may generate statements which, although equally valid as ‘ministerial 
statements’, generate uncertainty and contradiction rather than clarity. 
Furthermore, where provisions allow for different interpretations, 'intention' may 
be in dispute and the subject of power struggles within Government; it may also 
change as executive and administrative personnel changes.  Necessarily, such after 
the fact or shifting ‘intention’ creates the scope for prior ministerial statements or 
statements in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill to contradict later statements.   
An important question in determining the relevance of ministerial statements 
of intention made in Parliament is how clear and certain do they have to be in 
order to be admissible. Is there any scope to rely on statements where there are 
other statements which contradict, or are inconsistent with, the statement that is 
relied upon? In R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and Regions, Ex Parte 
Spath Holme their Lordships observed that in order to rely on the exception in 
Pepper v Hart the legislative record must be ‘clear and unequivocal’ and amount to a 
‘consistent series of answers given by ministers’ amounting to view that ‘would 
almost certainly settle the matter immediately one way or the other’.130 Lord 
Nichols in this case observed ‘that the Parliamentary statement relied upon must 
be clear and unequivocal. Otherwise it is of no real use. Parliamentary statements 
                                                     
127 R v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and the Regions, Ex parte Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 2 AC 349 per 
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead at 399. 
128 See Lord Hoffmann, 'The Intolerable Wrestle with Words and Meanings'  (1997) 114 South African Law 
Journal 669. 
129 Ibid. 
130 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] 2 AC 34 per Lord Bingham of 
Cornhill quoting Lord Reid in R v Warner [1969] 2 AC 256 and observing also that 'the conditions laid 
down by the house in Pepper v Hart be strictly insisted upon'. 
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rarely satisfy this test on the points of interpretation which come before the 
courts’.131 The Rule in Pepper v Hart does not allow courts to attempt to resolve any 
uncertainty as to what was meant or intended by the Executive.132 As Lord 
Bingham observed in Ex parte Spath Holme: 
 
Unless Parliamentary statements are indeed clear and unequivocal [...] the 
court is likely to be drawn into comparing one statement with another, 
appraising the meaning and effect of what was said and considering what was 
left unsaid and why. In the course of such an exercise the court would come 
uncomfortably close to questioning the proceedings in Parliament contrary to 
article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 (1 Will & Mary, sess 2, c 2) and might even 
violate that important constitutional prohibition.133 
 
Accordingly, in their Lordships view the presence of contradictory or inconsistent 
statements would exclude reliance on any statement. If ministerial statements are 
admissible as probative evidence of intention it is because Parliament, acting 
through its members, is deemed to have adopted or to share this view as to what 
the provision is intended to achieve.  But this presumptive relationship between 
ministerial statement and Parliamentary intent disintegrates if ministerial 
statements are unclear or equivocal. Parliament can only have one intention and 
where the Executive itself is unclear or inconsistent then logically these statements 
can have no probative value for such singular Parliamentary intention. The only 
way to connect equivocal statements to Parliamentary intent would be to treat 
Parliamentary intention as majority member intention and then to determine 
which members adopted which ministerial statement of intent. But not only is 
such a determination impossible, such an approach is inconsistent with the Rule in 
Pepper v Hart and, as Lord Bingham observed, may well be unconstitutional 
because it amounts to questioning the debates or proceedings of Parliament. As a 
result, where the Executive’s statements are equivocal all statements fall and are 
inadmissible.  It does not matter whether: one of the statements was made more 
often than the other; one statement makes less sense that the other; one of the 
statements was specific and the other one general; or one of the statements was 
made by a minister thought to be more in command of his brief than another. 
                                                     
131 R v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and the Regions, Ex parte Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 2 AC 349 at 
398. See also: Wilson v First Country Trust Ltd [2003] UKHL 40; Harding v Wealands [2006] UKHL 32; Yarl’s 
Wood Immigration Ltd v Bedfordshire Police Authority [2008] EWHC 2207 (Comm). 
132 See R. Unison [2009] EWHC 3221 per Cranston J: 'the rival contentions in this case about the Hansard 
material underlines the danger of resorting to it except when absolutely required under Pepper v 
Hart…There are also the difficulties of interpreting what the minister or promoting parliamentarian 
means which can result, as in this case, in the focus moving from understanding the language of the 
legislation as enacted to attaching a meaning to the language of debate'. However, see R.v JTB [2009] AC 
1310 at [21] where their Lordships rely on Pepper v Hart yet dismiss a contradictory statement made by a 
Government minister.   A position, which is inconsistent with the position in Pepper v Hart and Spath 
Holme but also with the theory underpinning Pepper v Hart discussed in the following paragraph. 
133 R v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and the Regions, Ex parte Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 2 AC 349 at 
39. Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 provides that ' debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to 
be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament'. 
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2. Pepper v Harting Part 11 
Assuming that Part 11 of the Act can be rationally constructed consistently with 
the different interpretations of the Act set forth above, there is a clear ambiguity 
supporting the consideration of Parliamentary material.134 Most commentators are 
of the view that this material supports the position that the purpose of Part 11 was 
to abolish wrongdoer control in order to make derivative litigation available 
against widely held companies.135    However, as we shall see below, the overall 
record is not unequivocal raising real doubt about its admissibility as an 
interpretative aid.  
The Law Commission’s affirmation of the proper plaintiff rule as a guiding 
principle, but its actual rejection of the proper plaintiff rule as a substantive rule of 
UK company law appears to generate ministerial confusion and a resulting 
problem for legislative intent.  For Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney General, 
although the Bill's objective was to implement the Commission's 
recommendations it did not, consistently with the view expressed in the 
Explanatory Notes to the Bill, 'introduce any major change of principle to the law in 
this area’.136  As noted above, the removal of the wrongdoer control bar to 
bringing an action is clearly a significant change of principle; one that would 
challenge the proper plaintiff principle.  More precise Parliamentary language on 
wrongdoer control was provided by Lord Goldsmith on several occasions. He 
observed that under the common law regime there were significant difficulties in 
identifying whether there was wrongdoer control and clarified that ‘having to 
demonstrate wrongdoer control does not appear in the Government’s 
approach’.137  In a later debate, he observed that ‘we made a conscious decision 
not to continue [with wrongdoer control] as part of the derivative claim 
procedure’.138  
How do we make sense of this ‘no change but change’ mantra? The proper 
plaintiff rule is (was) an elemental rule of UK company law. Wrongdoer control is 
the corollary of that rule. To dismantle it abolishes the foundational rule and 
amounts to a ‘major change of principle’. Perhaps the Government incorrectly 
viewed wrongdoer control as simply part of the fraud on the minority exception, 
which was being abolished, and not part of the proper plaintiff rule, which 
remained in place.  This reading is affirmed by the Solicitor General in the debate 
in the following July when he observed, on the morning of 13 July 2006, that 
although the Government was reaffirming ‘the purpose behind the Rule in Foss v 
Harbottle and that we do not seek in any way to repeal it’ (emphasis supplied):139 
                                                     
134 The courts reticence to use Pepper v Hart often manifests itself in a finding that legislation is sufficiently 
clear. Such a reading clearly cannot be ruled out in relation to Part 11.  
135 See above note 48. 
136 Grand Committee, House of Lords, 27 February 2006 Hansard Column CG4. 
137 Ibid CG 7.  
138 Hansard (HL) (9 May, 2006, Column, 888).   
139 Standing Committee D, Company Law Reform Bill 13 July 2006. Column No. 661. 
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The new statutory procedure differs from the common law in two key 
respects. First, we do not want the claimant to have to show ‘wrongdoer 
control’—that the directors whom the claimant believes have acted in breach 
of their duties to the company are in control of the company—as this may 
make it impossible for a derivative claim to be brought successfully by a 
member of a widely held company.140 
 
This ‘no change but change’ contradiction generated confusion in the debates 
themselves. In the afternoon session on the same day, following the tabling of an 
amendment to reintroduce a wrongdoer control requirement and in response to 
Jonathan Djanogly MP’s question: ‘am I right in thinking that the law remains as it 
is in terms of fraud on minority and that it will just not be put in the Bill?’, the 
Solicitor General unhelpfully replied: ‘Let me examine that. Our aim will be to 
ensure that we get the provision correct, and it is important that this area is 
clarified. It will not remain as it is, in the sense that, at the moment, we and the 
Law Commission are saying that there is a certain lack of clarity’.141 He agreed to 
send a note on the issue to the Commons' Committee; a note that this author has 
been unable to find on the public record. This Minister’s position on wrongdoer 
control was repeated in a subsequent debate.142   
The Parliamentary record reveals a reform body / legislative intent bias in 
favour of viewing Part 11 as abolishing the wrongdoer control pre-requisite to 
make it possible to bring derivative litigation against widely-held companies.  But 
is this a Parliamentary record that would be admissible to support a contention 
that Part 11 has abolished a requirement of wrongdoer control to the bringing of a 
derivative claim?  It is submitted that it would not. As noted above, pursuant to 
the Rule in Pepper v Hart what the Executive intended, as stated in Parliament, may 
be relied on as an interpretative aid where that record of intention is so ‘clear and 
unequivocal’ that it would ‘almost certainly settle the matter immediately one way 
or the other’.143 The Parliamentary statements and material on Part 11 do not 
satisfy this threshold condition, and should not therefore be considered by a court.  
On the one hand, whilst it is clear that the Government placed explicit reliance on 
the Law Commission report, on the other hand, the Government appeared not to 
understand that it is not possible to avoid ‘major change’ - to reaffirm and not to 
‘repeal in any way’ the Rule in Foss v Harbottle - while at the same time abolishing 
the wrongdoer control requirement and, thereby, the proper plaintiff rule. It had 
to be one or the other because the wrongdoer control requirement does not reside 
merely in a detachable exception to the rule; it is an expression of the fundamental 
                                                     
140 Standing Committee D, Company Law Reform Bill 13 July 2006. Column No. 665. 
141 Standing Committee D, Company Law Reform Bill 13 July 2006. Column Nos 679 and 680. 
142 Standing Committee D, Company Law Reform Bill October 2006 Column 832. 
143 R v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and the Regions, Ex parte Spath Holmes Ltd [2001] 2 AC 349 at 
398 per Lord Nicholls noting further that 'if the parliamentary statements relied on are not clear, they are 
of little or no value and cannot qualify as an external aid in the particular case'. 
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rule.  That is, in these statements the ministers say that wrongdoer control was not 
abolished and abolished in the same breath. 
Although, most corporate lawyers will feel that intended abolition may well 
overall be the better reading of the legislative history, to get there one needs to 
read between the lines, which Pepper v Hart does not allow. Pepper v Hart does not 
permit courts to attempt determine what ministers ‘really meant’ or to parse and 
filter inconsistent statements. If there are inconsistent statements then all 
statements are inadmissible. As Lord Bingham observed in Spath Holmes the court 
cannot ‘be drawn into comparing one statement with another’.   Accordingly, our 
assessment of the current status of the proper plaintiff rule must be based on Part 
11 alone read in the context of the prior common law rules and the context 
provided by the Explanatory Notes to the Bill.    
 
 
 
VI ALTERNATIVE PATHS TO WRONGDOER CONTROL 
 
In assessing whether the Act should be interpreted as abolishing or retaining a 
wrongdoer control threshold condition we need also to evaluate the alternative 
ways in which the Act may allow courts to take account of a still applicable proper 
plaintiff rule. Roth J in Bamford v Harvey and Judge Pelling in Stimpson v Southern 
Private Landlords Association offer such an alternative. For Roth J, in particular, as 
the proper plaintiff rule remains the guiding principle of the law in this context, 
the question of whether the company is capable of acting for itself needs to be 
factored into the permission decision. In both Roth J and Judge Pelling’s view as 
section 263(3) provides for a non-exclusive list of factors, the presence or absence 
of wrongdoer control may be taken into account at this final stage of the 
permission proceeding.  
We have noted above the logical inconsistency of holding that the proper 
plaintiff rule is unaltered whilst rejecting the wrongdoer control as a threshold 
requirement.144 Although this conflict can be somewhat assuaged by viewing the 
proper plaintiff rule as a ‘guiding principle’ rather than an applicable rule of law 
and taking account of corporate capability through 263(3), this approach is taken 
at the expense of the logical structure of 263(3). By introducing wrongdoer control 
through section 263(3) a hierarchy of considerations is introduced to a provision 
that on its face provides for a set of unweighted possible considerations which 
share a common purpose. For Judge Pelling the absence of wrongdoer control 
may be an ‘overwhelming’ consideration and for Roth J although he protests that 
he is not ‘elevating wrongdoer control to a preclusive condition’ his holding 
appears to be very close to such a condition: 
 
                                                     
144 See text to notes 59-60. 
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When proceedings can clearly be brought in the name of the company and 
there is no objection raised on that ground, they should be brought in the 
name of the company (emphasis added). 
 
Wrongdoer control is prioritised not only because it is the product of a ‘guiding 
principle’ but also because its consideration through 263(3) introduces a factor 
that is qualitatively different than the expressly articulated considerations set forth 
in 263(3). The articulated considerations point the court towards possible evidence 
that the action is, or is not, in the corporate interest – is it being pursued by a 
person who in good faith wants to further the corporate interest; would a 
hypothetical director support the bringing of the action; what did the board 
actually decide and what was the make-up of that board; what might the 
disinterested shareholders do if asked to ratify or give their views on the decision? 
Even the requirement to consider whether the member has an alternative personal 
remedy – which on its face appears unrelated to the corporate interest – is 
understood through this lens: where the pursuit of the derivative action is really a 
cost effective way of negotiating a personal remedy that could be enforced 
separately, permission is likely to be refused.145 In such circumstances necessarily 
the action is not being brought by a member who views the action as being 
primarily in the corporate interest. There is then no need to specify a hierarchy of 
these considerations as they all contribute to an assessment of the same question.  
In contrast, the question of whether the company is capable of acting does 
not have anything to say about whether the action would benefit the company or 
not, it is purely a question about whether the company is in a position to make 
that decision itself. It is clearly possible that the company is capable of making the 
decision and yet in the court’s view it would be in the company’s interest to pursue 
that litigation. Where considerations directly conflict, to ensure that judges do ‘not 
sit under a palm tree’,146 a hierarchy of considerations is necessary. But prioritizing 
company capability creates an anomalous situation in which a consideration which 
is not referred to in section 263(3) and which is qualitatively different from the 
articulated considerations, becomes (in relation to a company where there is no 
wrongdoer control or other form of corporate disability) the most powerful, if not 
the only, consideration.   
If other courts were to follow this approach we appear to end up in more or 
less the same substantive place as we would if we were to decide, as argued in this 
article, that the better reading of Part 11 is one that provides for the retention of a 
wrongdoer control threshold condition. It is submitted that the later solution is 
both more consistent with the rules of statutory interpretation and a more logical 
and cleaner solution than the approach adopted in Bamford v Harvey.  
 
 
                                                     
145 Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd [2010] All ER (D) 108. 
146 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 2 BCLC 1 per Lord Hoffmann quoting Warner J in In re J.E. Cade & Son [1992] 
BCLC 213. 
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VII CONCLUSION 
 
For commentators who had long lamented the deficiencies of the Rule in Foss v 
Harbottle, Part 11 was a fresh start. It was a ‘new’ derivative claim mechanism. 
Most importantly, it represented the demise of the wrongdoer control and the 
'fraud' pre-requisites to the bringing of a derivative action. Recent first instance 
judgments in Wishart v Castelcroft Securities Ltd, Cinematic Finance v Ryder and Bamford 
v Harvey encourage a careful consideration of the basis for this consensus position. 
Its exploration in this article suggests that we may be guilty of wishful thinking.  
The consensus position that Part 11 represents change and not continuity is 
primarily a function of the discipline’s view that the legislative history of Part 11 
shows us that the reforms were intended to implement the Law Commission's 
recommendations to abolish wrongdoer control and subject widely-held 
companies to some, rather than no, exposure to derivative litigation. This after all 
is what several, widely cited, ministers stated during the legislative process. The 
problem, however, is that the judge who is required to consider the contemporary 
status of the proper plaintiff rule and the role of wrongdoer control must do so 
through the lenses of a person who: (1) does not think that the Act implements 
the Law Commission's proposals or responds to its view of the mischief of the 
common law; (2) has no knowledge of the legislative debate and the ministerial 
statements made in those debates; and (3) gives little weight to the Explanatory 
Notes to the Act. When this extra-legislative record is filtered through our rules on 
statutory interpretation what is left is the mischief addressed by the Act as set 
forth in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill which provide that the new mechanism was 
not designed to overturn the common law’s well established principles.  
A judge asked to consider the status of wrongdoer control as a threshold 
determination to the bringing of a derivative claim is, therefore, left to make this 
decision though her reading of the statute in light of the context provided by the 
Explanatory Notes to the Bill. The statute itself could be read either way. On the one 
hand it can clearly be read as providing the court with a set of rules to determine 
when the derivative claim must be discontinued and with a set of considerations to 
take into account when exercising its permission discretion. From this perspective 
the proper plaintiff rule and wrongdoer control (as a threshold consideration) are 
irrelevant as they are not referred to: derivative claims can be brought subject only 
to the court's permission to continue those claims, which will be given or denied 
in accordance with the considerations and directions provided in section 263 of 
the Act.  From this perspective, the absence of wrongdoer control or other form 
of corporate incapability does not operate as an absolute bar to the bringing of an 
action. However, the statute can also be read as providing a procedure for the 
application of all prior common law rules, including the proper plaintiff rule. 
Pursuant to this reading at Stage 1 the court, inter alia, determines whether there is 
a '"prima facie case" for giving permission' which – relying on the common law's 
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understanding of this term – involves a threshold determination of whether the 
company is capable of acting for itself which in most cases will involve an 
assessment of whether the wrongdoers control the general meeting. At Stage 2, 
following the initial finding of general meeting incapability, the court must 
determine following receipt of evidence from all parties whether the litigation 
should be permitted to proceed by applying the section 263 criteria. Both these 
readings are viable. Based on the Act alone, there is not, as our rules of statutory 
interpretation require, a compellingly clear implication that the proper plaintiff rule 
as a substantive rule of law has been replaced. When this reading of the Act is 
coupled with the mischief of the Act identifiable from the Explanatory Notes to the 
Bill the case for continuity is a strong one. 
If this is correct, company lawyers have been led astray by Pepper v Hart.  
Attention to the detailed holding in Pepper v Hart shows clearly that the 
admissibility of Parliamentary material is subject to demanding constraints. But the 
actual holding of a case may diverge from the subsequent life and effects of a case. 
Pepper v Hart stands in many commentators’ mind's eye for the admissibility of the 
supporting Parliamentary statements which they identify.  The identified 
statements and the interpretations they support may, as is the case with Part 11, 
generate a consensus view of the effects of law reform. A view which we may 
struggle to detach ourselves from when we ask carefully whether such statements 
are in fact admissible after all.  As Lord Browne-Wilkinson observed ‘having once 
looked at what was said in Parliament it is difficult to put it out of mind’.147 
 
 
                                                     
147 Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 [117] quoted also by Lord Steyn above n. 116 at 66 when discussing the 
practical difficulties of separating consideration of the ministerial statements after an exhaustive 
consideration of the meaning of the statute. 
